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Abstract 
Resource Revanchism: 
The Privatization and Renationalization 
of the Russian Oil Industry 
by 
Jason Michael Bilodeau, MGPS/MA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 
Supervisor:  David Spence 
The Russian oil industry has long been one of the most prominent and valuable oil 
sectors in the world. Under the Soviet Union, the oil industry was subject to tight state 
control. Prices and production targets were determined by political leaders in Moscow, 
not market signals. The 1995 industry privatization after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
resulted in many industry assets being auction at extremely discounted prices to a few 
connected businessmen. Some of the new oil company owners quickly invited Western 
companies to partner in Russian plays. The differences in Western business culture, 
oilfield operations, and profit-seeking behavior created tremendous resentment among the 
rank-in-file Soviet-era oilmen. They, along with conservatives, believed their skepticism 
of Western involvement was vindicated by a devastating Russian recession in the late 
1990s. This economic crisis paved the way for Vladimir Putin’s election in 2000. A 
former intelligence officer with a desire to reassert Russian influence on the global stage, 
Putin quickly sought to recapture state control of the oil sector. By the end of his first 
term in 2004, Putin had orchestrated the fall of the most prominent oligarch, Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, and his oil company Yukos, funneling its most valuable assets into a new 
vi	
state oil champion, Rosneft. The path of the Russian oil industry from fully state-owned 
enterprises to private companies and back to falling under heavy state influence 
underscores the importance of oil as a resource to the Russian state and, most 
importantly, how the long history of strong, autocratic governance in Russia affected its 
relationship with foreigners, served as the impetus for renationalization in the 2000s, and 
continues to influence the Kremlin’s view that Russia’s energy industry is, first and 
foremost, a tool of the state. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaders of the new Russian Federation 
set out to remake the economic structure in their country by establishing a market-based 
system open to the rest of the world. The privatization of state assets that followed 
fundamentally shifted the balance of financial and political power in the country. One of 
the most prized industries to leave state control was the tremendously valuable and 
strategically important oil sector. While most industries maintained relative 
independence, freedom from the state was short-lived in others. Perhaps most notably, 
the nascent private oil companies in Russia quickly found their assets in the Kremlin’s 
crosshairs.   
In diplomatic parlance, revanchism is the term for a policy pursued by a state 
seeking to reclaim land lost in war. In losing and subsequently clawing back ownership 
of its oil resources, Russia’s treatment of its natural resource sector exhibited shocking 
parallels to a state targeting its lost territory. Less than a decade after initiating a 
privatization process, Russian leadership began using the tools of the state to influence 
the ability of the oil industry to make independent business decisions. Over time, those in 
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power solidified their view that control of the oil sector was critical to Russia’s national 
interest, resulting in ever more state involvement. By the mid-2000s, the Kremlin wielded 
so much influence that the state was the de-facto owner of the largest oil company in the 
country. Today, in the culmination of a policy of resource revanchism, the most valuable 
and strategically important oilfields and related industry assets are either officially or 
effectively under state control.   
Why were Russian oil assets brought back under state influence so shortly after 
being sold? The answer lies in the details of the disintegration of the Soviet system; the 
asset privatization process; a series of cultural clashes pitting Soviet-era oil bosses and 
conservative Russia leaders against the young, liberal oligarchs and their Western 
business partners; and, ultimately, the belief by those in the Kremlin’s upper echelons 
that Russian grand strategy necessitated centralized control of the oil industry.  
 
Two Themes 
 
In analyzing the arc of the Russian oil sector over its first fifteen post-communist 
years, two themes appear in stark relief: the critical importance that oil plays in the 
Russian economy and the extent to which Russian culture and history impact the 
development of the industry. Throughout this study, these two trends will be readily 
apparent, regularly acting as drivers of both private industry and public sector decision-
making. Perhaps most importantly, given the prominence of these two themes in recent 
Russian history, they offer a valuable lens through which to analyze current Russian 
leadership and potential future decisions coming from the Kremlin. 
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Recent supply-side discussions and market analyses regarding the global oil 
market often revolve around Saudi Arabia and the United States. As the leader of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the vanguard of the shale 
revolution, respectively, this focus is not at all surprising. However, Russia quietly 
ranked third in 2014 in production of petroleum and other hydrocarbon liquids, behind 
only Saudi Arabia and the United States, pumping 10.9 million barrels per day (b/d).1 The 
United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported in July 2015 that Russia 
was the world’s largest producer of crude oil (including lease condensate).2 This is not a 
new phenomenon. Russia has long been known for its oil wealth, with some of the first 
major oil operations in the world located in Baku, what was then Russian territory but is 
now the capital of Azerbaijan.3 As the industry grew, so too did its importance to the 
state. In 2010, oil accounted for 28% of total government revenue according to the 
Natural Resource Governance Institute4 and 14.7% of total Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) according to the World Bank.5  
Russia’s reliance on oil as a percentage of export revenue is even greater. In 2013, 
crude oil and petroleum products accounted for 33% and 21% of total export revenue,  
 
 
																																																						
1 “Russia.” The United States Energy Information Administration. July 28, 2015. 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Russia/russia.pdf. 
2 “Russia.” The United States Energy Information Administration. July 28, 2015. 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Russia/russia.pdf. 
3 Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1991. 57-61. 
4 “Russia.” Natural Resource Governance Institute. 
http://www.resourcegovernance.org/countries/europe/russia/overview. 
5 “Oil Rents.” The World Bank. 2011. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS/countries/1W-RU?display=graph. 
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Figure 1: Oil Rents as a Percentage of GDP: Russia Versus World Average 
 
 
Source: World Bank, 2011. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS?page=4 
 
 
respectively, totaling 54% of over $523 billion (USD).6 Revenue generated via exports is 
a pertinent figure because it demonstrates the role that the oil industry plays in the ability 
of the Russian economy to acquire foreign currency reserves. A steady flow of global 
reserve currencies such as the US dollar and the euro is important, as these currencies 
help insulate Russia from fluctuations in the value of its own currency, the ruble. Oil 
revenue and the strength of the oil industry is, by no small measure, an extremely 
important component of the Russian economy and the state’s ability to maintain fiscal 
																																																						
6 “Oil and natural gas sales accounted for 68% of Russia’s total export revenue in 2013.” The United States 
Energy Information Administration. July 23, 2014. 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17231. 
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strength. Sitting with the world’s eighth-largest bounty of proved reserves,7 
approximately 80 billion barrels,8 the oil industry is unlikely to lose this position of 
prominence in Russia any time soon. 
The second theme that pervaded the development of the Russian oil sector 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s was the influence of the country’s unique history 
and culture. Three aspects within this theme stick out in particular: Russia’s history of 
authoritarian governance, the Kremlin’s deep-seeded suspicion of foreign influence, and 
the desire to recover from the embarrassment resulting from the collapse of the Soviet 
system. These historical and cultural undercurrents served as ever-present factors that 
shaped the relationship between the oil industry and the Russian government. 
The history of strong central government in Russia dates back to the beginning of 
the Tsarist era in 1524 and lasted until the end of the Soviet era in 1991. Authoritarian 
rule had notable effects on the oil industry. Overall, it influenced the ability of Soviet-era 
oilfield managers to adjust to structural changes to the economy that were instituted in the 
1990s. In the 2000s, the tradition of strong central government remained important, as it 
also helped color the way that Vladimir Putin and his political allies viewed the 
relationship between the oil industry and the state.  
The legacy of strong central government looms large in the Russian ethos. 
Russian Tsars ruled for centuries via divine right. Their authority was absolute.9 In this 
																																																						
7 “Crude Oil Proved Reserves – 2015.” The United States Energy Information Administration. 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/. 
8 "Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production." Oil and Gas Journal, December 1, 2014, 32.  
9 Engelstein, Laura. "Combined Underdevelopment: Discipline and the Law in Imperial and Soviet Russia." 
The American Historical Review 98, no. 2 (1993): 338. doi:10.2307/2166836.  
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regard, the Tsars were similar to the other monarchs of 15th-18th century Europe. 
However, this sense of national pride and exceptionalism developed differently in Russia 
than in the other great European monarchies such as Great Britain and France. 
Throughout its history, perhaps as a result of its expansive size and ungovernable 
borderlands, Russia has regularly had to defend itself from foreign invaders. This history 
of invasion attempts allowed the Tsar to entreat his subjects to coalesce in defense of the 
homeland and build a sense of nationalistic pride that buffeted the legitimacy of his 
authority.10  
When Napoleon’s Grande Armée spread throughout Europe, sowing the seeds of 
weakness in the concept of absolute rule, Tsar Alexander I of Russia perceived an 
existential threat not only to Russian territorial integrity, but to the very system of 
government that legitimized his regime.11 As such, not only did he employ his forces to 
stifle Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, Tsar Alexander I created the Holy Alliance with the 
Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia in order to suppress liberalism and other 
revolutionary movements in Europe.12  
When such revolution broke out across the continent, the eastern monarchies of 
the Holy Alliance, with Russia as its leader, proposed a plan to the Concert of Powers to 
approach the “problem” as they would regular crime. In this Protocole, the Tsar proposed 
“preventing the progress of the evil with which the body social is menaced.”13 In this 
																																																						
10 Notable invasions of Russia include the Mongols in 1223 and 1236, Sweden in 1707, and France in 1812. 
11 Bobbitt, Philip. The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History. New York: Alfred A 
Knopf, 2002. 157. 
12 Bobbitt, Philip. The Shield of Achilles. 165.  
13 Bobbitt, Philip. The Shield of Achilles. 166-167. 
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regard, Russia served as the guarantor of the divine right of kings, the philosophical 
underpinning of absolute rule. It is little surprise that Russia was the last remaining 
absolute monarchy in Europe, with that form of government remaining until the 
Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. 
While the divine right of the Tsars ended with the fall of the Romanov dynasty in 
1917, authoritarianism, strong central government, and duty to the state certainly did not. 
Soviet leadership, while presuming to speak for and enable the masses, kept a 
commanding grip on state decision-making, maintaining fierce control over the central 
planning of the economy.14 The oil industry was no exception. This was clear throughout 
the 1990s and early 2000s. This dynamic between the oil sector and the state proved to be 
a great source of tension between the free market champions that saw profit as their 
North Star and the government officials that could not fathom resource companies not 
serving state interests. In this sense, Russia’s lack of experience, so to speak, with 
democracy and separation between the state and the private sector had a tremendous 
influence on the experience of the Russian oil industry in the wake of the Soviet collapse. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
14 For examples of the centralized control of the Soviet revolutionaries and ruthlessness of their security 
services in buttressing the state and communist ideology, see The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin 
Archive and the Secret History of the KGB by Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin. Mitrokhin was a 
career archivist at the KGB who, for decades, stashed documentation of Soviet security operations 
classified at the highest level. The Sword and the Shield offers an unparalleled look into the extent that the 
Soviet Union maintained the tsarist tradition of absolute centralized control. 
Andrew, Christopher M., and Vasili Mitrokhin. The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the 
Secret History of the KGB. New York: Basic Books, 1999.  
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Chapter I: Going Vertical: The Soviet System Falls Apart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Soviet Oil Apparatus 
 
The structure of the Soviet oil sector was very hierarchal. Policymakers in the 
Kremlin made high-level industry decisions and delegated oversight of everyday 
operations to various ministries. Located in Moscow, the Ministry of Oil managed 
decisions regarding upstream activities such as the production and transportation of crude 
oil. Refining and other midstream processes were governed by a separate entity, the 
Ministry of Refining and Petrochemicals. Finally, a third government office, the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade, oversaw the management of oil exports. At each point in this chain of 
control, the title of the product changed hands, leaving each individual entity, most 
consequentially for the Ministry of Oil, very little control beyond its ministry-specific 
purview. In this regard, the Soviet oil industry structure was very disjointed and flat, far 
from vertically integrated and internally communicative like Western international oil 
companies (IOCs). A mid-level Soviet oil worker responsible for production could spend 
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his entire career without ever having the need to speak with someone in charge of 
refining or other operations further downstream.15  
Due to tight government control and strict adherence to the 5-year production 
plans issued by the Kremlin, nobody that actually managed the product at any point in the 
value chain was responsible for making decisions of consequence. Instead, top ministry 
officials and more senior policymakers in the Kremlin set production targets that were to 
be strictly followed. The person in charge of imposing Moscow’s production targets was 
often the political boss of the province in which a given oilfield was located. This boss, 
technically the first secretary of the party’s province committee, was known as the 
obkom.  
The obkom issued Kremlin directives to the regional production associations, the 
ob”edineniia, which in turn controlled oilfield-level production units known as 
neftegazodobyyvaiushchaia upravleniia, or NGDUs. There were two divergent opinions 
of Moscow’s production strategy held by Soviet oil workers in the trenches: first, that 
production should be pushed higher, and second, that the ever-increasing production 
targets recklessly led to premature oilfield decline. However, their opinions mattered 
little. Failing to meet the goals dictated by Moscow was an invitation for disaster for the 
obkom and, by extension, to miss targets passed along by the obkom was career suicide 
																																																						
15 Hewitt, Ed A. Energy, Economics, and Foreign Policy in the Soviet Union. Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 1984. 
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for the oilmen. In the early 1980s, hundreds of senior managers were fired due to their 
failure to meet higher production targets.16 
Such production targets were not governed by economics or market dynamics. In 
fact, the centrally planned economy of the Soviet Union hardly functioned as an economy 
at all. It was more of a mechanism for turning oil into a source of solvent funding for 
various political priorities. This manner of resource development was a recipe for disaster 
for the long-term sustainability of the sector. Soviet oilmen were often trained as 
geologists and engineers in the country’s various technical universities. As such, while 
they were aware of some of the physical and geological repercussions of excessive 
production, they did not grasp the complex financial management that an executive at any 
IOC would undoubtedly understand. In the Soviet oil workforce from the policymakers 
down to the oilfield bosses, collectively referred to as neftianiki, nobody worried much 
about cost management or optimizing return on investment.  
In this sense, the Soviet era oil industry benefited from what economist János 
Kornai refers to as “soft budget constraints.” Kornai says that the relationship between 
earnings and expenditures in certain economic units or industries can be ‘relaxed,’ 
particularly in socialist systems. Under this concept, a state that occupies a more 
paternalistic role toward certain industries or firms can offer support that allows the firms 
to pursue activities that they otherwise would not if they had to adhere strictly to the 
constraints of their revenue stream. This government support can include lobbying, tax 
																																																						
16 Gustafson, Thane. Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and Power in Russia. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2012. 33-34 
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breaks, and cash subsidies among other forms.17 A firm or industry that receives state 
support and benefits from soft budget constraints has less incentive to focus clearly on 
increasing efficiency and maximizing profit.  
In the Soviet world of soft budget constraints and politically mandated production 
targets, funding was wasted and misallocated on poor projects. Wells were drilled in 
inefficient formations. Reservoir pressure was not managed, contributing to the 
precipitous and inordinate decline of production rates. Permanent cities with large non-oil 
worker populations were constructed around prominent oilfields, leaving the government 
eager to prevent any “bust” periods in the typical boom-bust cycle from ever setting in.18 
In short, the top-down policies from the Kremlin completely skewed the incentive 
structure of the Soviet oil sector. 
 
Gorbachev’s Perestroika 
 
Mikhail Gorbachev came to power vowing to reboot the struggling Soviet 
economy. Shortly after becoming President of the Soviet Union in 1985, Gorbachev 
initiated his signature program, perestroika. This initiative, which would last through the 
twilight of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, sought to introduce small market 
incentives into the command economy in order to retain the essence of the Soviet system 
while allowing it to react with a bit more agility to global market signals and the needs of 
industry. As Gorbachev would find, the introduction of market forces was tantamount to 
																																																						
17 Kornai, János, Eric Maskin, and Gérard Roland. “Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint.” Journal of 
Economic Literature 41 (2003). 
18 Gustafson, Thane. Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and Power in Russia. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2012. 35. 
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opening Pandora’s box, and despite the good intentions behind his program, perestroika 
was the beginning of the end for Soviet control of the economy all together. 
A fundamental underpinning of the Soviet system was that administrators in 
Moscow set prices. When Gorbachev allowed prices to be determined by supply and 
demand, the artificial equilibrium held in place by the Kremlin quickly readjusted. This 
caused the value of the ruble to drop and invited inflation, crippling what were previously 
stable government revenue streams.19 Another dramatic aspect of perestroika was the 
shift in control over finances, investments, and, perhaps most importantly, hiring 
decisions from central state control to the regional enterprise managers. Naturally, the 
authority of local managers to hire and fire employees also meant that oil workers could 
quit their jobs to take positions for other operations under different bosses. The Kremlin 
underestimated the scarcity of labor in the oil industry, resulting in a chaotic shift in 
power from the central government not to the local bosses, but to the workers. The 
common rig operators began to make wage demands and hold elections for their bosses. 
This change undermined the very basis of Soviet authority over labor. Gorbachev tried to 
reverse some of the changes in order to manage the transition, but it was too late.  
Throughout the perestroika era, from 1985 to 1991, the central government tried 
desperately to maintain high production levels in the oil industry in order to keep state 
revenue stable. Warm weather in 1986 helped to increase crop yields and lower demand 
for heating oil, which increased revenue that the state could use to invest in the oil 
industry and mitigate the drop in global oil prices. In subsequent years, as agricultural 
																																																						
19 Aslund, Anders. Gorbachev’s Struggle for Economic Reform. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 1991 
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output returned to average levels, the Kremlin was forced to rely on its foreign currency 
reserves to prop up the industry.20 From 1985 to 1989, central government funding for 
capital expenditure in the oil industry rose by 47%.21 Of course, this strategy was not 
sustainable, and as foreign currency reserves declined, so too did the production levels of 
Soviet oilfields.  
The oilfield managers pleaded with the central government to cut production 
quotas and allow greater quantities of oil to be exported so that they could raise the 
capital required to purchase much-needed equipment. Policymakers in Moscow were 
determined to maintain high production levels in order to keep government revenue 
steady and prevent producers from shortchanging domestic supply in order to sell greater 
quantities of oil in the more lucrative export market. Increased exports, they feared, 
would cause a supply shortage in the domestic market.22 While perestroika restructured 
the economy in a way that Gorbachev saw as necessary to institute and manage 
incremental change in the USSR, the changes only sped up as the Soviet system reached 
its twilight. 
 
Yeltsin’s ‘Shock Therapy’ 
 
Boris Yeltsin was elected President of the Soviet Union in June 1991, at a time 
when many doubted the ability of the Soviet system of governance to survive the 
dramatic changes instituted under Gorbachev. Indeed, by the end of 1991, the Soviet 
																																																						
20 Gaidar, Yegor. Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia. Brookings Institution Press: 
Washington, DC, 2010. 133. 
21 Sagers, Matthew J. “News Notes: Special Regional Development Program for Tyumen’ Oblast’ 
Established by RSFSR Government,” Soviet Geography 32, no. 9 (1991): 633. 
22 Aslund, Anders. Gorbachev’s Struggle for Economic Reform. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 1991 
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Union ceased to exist. President Yeltsin was not blind to the writing on the wall. Instead 
of suffering through the death throes of the command economy, Yeltsin and his advisors 
opted to suddenly force even greater structural changes in the hopes that economic 
recovery would come more quickly. This ‘shock therapy,’ as the West called it, stemmed 
from the idea that the only way to avoid a prolonged period of economic distress was to, 
as author Chrystia Freeland puts it in her 2000 book Sale of the Century, “first demolish 
the Communist structure and then erect a market economy on the cleared site.” This 
effort consisted of immediate decontrol of prices, large cuts in government spending, and 
a quick privatization of state assets.23 
Despite the sweeping nature of these changes, the oil industry was again singled 
out by the state as a sector of strategic importance. In order to keep fuel prices in the 
domestic market from rising too quickly, Moscow exempted oil from deregulation, 
keeping prices artificially low. However, for most sectors, the broad price deregulation 
caused the cost of goods to rise quickly. This put the oil industry in a bind, as profits were 
capped below the true market equilibrium despite the cost of inputs (i.e., equipment and 
maintenance) being more expensive.24 This dynamic sent oilfield managers scrambling to 
secure the limited permits to export oil, which allowed them access to the more profitable 
global market. 
The hunt for export permits exposed a critical component of the privatization 
process that remains important today: the state-run monopoly over transportation 
																																																						
23 Freeland, Chrystia. Sale of the Century: Russia's Wild Ride from Communism to Capitalism. New York, 
N.Y: Crown Business, 2000. 34. 
24 Shleifer, Andrei and Daniel Treisman. “The Struggle to Beat Inflation.” Chap. 3 in Without a Map: 
Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000. 
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infrastructure and exports, centralized under an entity called Transneft. As previously 
noted, selling oil abroad during Yeltsin’s ‘shock therapy’ was considerably more 
lucrative than selling in the regulated domestic market, creating a high demand for export 
permits. The Kremlin saw its control of Transneft as important leverage over the oil 
companies. However, Moscow was unable to effectively use Transneft for this purpose in 
the early 1990s.  
This was the case for two reasons: first, in the relative vacuum left by the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, exports were difficult to track and quotas were often broken; product 
was sold abroad without the proper approvals. Second, Transneft, despite being managed 
and funded by the government, was in a poor financial situation. The reason for this is 
that, throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, Transneft operated by taking ownership of 
the oil passing through its physical infrastructure rather than simply being paid a fee for 
its services. This system worked when the Soviet government set prices and ensured that 
Transneft received fair compensation. However, when government control relaxed, 
upstream companies charged higher prices in order to recoup production costs while 
downstream customers only paid Transneft market prices for the product, resulting in 
significant financial losses in the midstream. 25 
In 1991, Valerii Cherniaev, the longtime head of Transneft, rectified the 
unsustainable pricing arrangement. Cherniaev invited foreign consultants to help design a 
tariff system similar to the ones employed by electric utilities in the West. In the new 
system, Transneft stopped taking ownership of the oil, but instead charged a fee for its 
																																																						
25 Gustafson, Thane. Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and Power in Russia. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2012. 80-83. 
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services. This system shielded Transneft from oil price fluctuations and guaranteed a 
steady source of income, which it used to repair aging infrastructure. With Transneft 
remaining a state-owned enterprise that did not take title of the product passing through 
its infrastructure, the nature of competition in the industry shifted further downstream, 
putting greater pressure on refineries and export terminals.26  
 
Centrifugal Forces Reined In 
 
From the late 1980s through 1992, the period after the start of perestroika but 
before the privatization process began in earnest, the Russian oil industry was marked by 
two phases of asset management: a rapid decentralization of assets and then a 
reconsolidation of assets into a handful of holding companies. As previously noted, 
perestroika delegated much of the decision-making power traditionally held by the 
central government to the local oilfield managers. This decentralization of authority acted 
as a centrifugal force in the oil industry that broke the institutional bonds that tied various 
oilfields together. Not surprisingly, the regional bosses and oilfield managers sought to 
cement control over their operations, resulting in an industry littered with a vast number 
of disparate production enterprises.27 
The industry was transforming from a horizontal, compartmentalized bureaucracy 
into a vertically integrated structure. However, with each oil boss attempting to assert 
authority over his small piece of the pie, this industry structure was unacceptable to many 
of the top managers and policymakers. The operating environment was chaotic. In an 
																																																						
26 Gustafson, Thane. Wheel of Fortune. 86 
27 Gustafson, Thane. Wheel of Fortune. 92 
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industry that relies heavily on technical cooperation for production and financial 
cooperation for exploration, the only way to allow numerous small companies to 
successfully operate, as in the United States, is to have a strong institutionalized rule of 
law. This was simply not the case in early-1990s Russia. 28  
University of Wisconsin Professor of Law and Political Science Kathryn Hendley 
characterizes the Russian legal environment as a dual system, one of ‘rule of law’ and 
‘telephone law.’ When civil suits are brought between parties of similar social status, the 
‘rule of law’ persists. However, in cases that involve parties with ties, formal or informal, 
to the government, ‘telephone law’ becomes more common. Hendley describes 
‘telephone law’ as the “practice by which the outcomes of cases allegedly come from 
orders issued order the phone by those with political power rather than the through the 
application of law.”29 As the oil industry in Russia fragmented into a multitude of small 
entities, many of which having extensive ties to high-ranking government officials, the 
increased threat of ‘telephone law’ hurt the business environment and stifled cooperation 
between the small oil-producing entities.  
One player in the industry pioneered an innovative organizational method meant 
to bring order to the chaos. Vagit Alekperov, the recently appointed deputy minister of 
oil, saw the negative effects of the industry Balkanization and suggested the creation of 
holding companies comprised of various production enterprises. The primary purpose of 
such entities was to stall the disarray in the industry and incentivize the coordination 
																																																						
28 Gustafson, Thane. Wheel of Fortune. 75 
29 Hendley, Kathryn. “Telephone Law and The Rule of Law: The Russian Case.” Hague Journal on the 
Rule of Law 1 (2009): 241-262. 
	18	
characteristic of vertically integrated companies. In this arrangement, the ob”edineniia 
(regional operations) maintained legal autonomy from the state, but did fall under 
temporary management of the holding companies.30  
In 1992, Boris Yeltsin created four such holding companies. Despite initial 
pushback from the ob”edineniia bosses, most ultimately concluded that this was the best 
opportunity to preserve their stakes. The owners of the consolidated assets received 
interest in the company in return for relinquishing decision-making authority to the new 
parent company. By taking a 45% stake in each company, the Kremlin both ensured that 
the state benefited from oil sales and proved to the investors that it was committed to 
their success. The agreement stipulated that the holding companies would dissolve after 
three years, giving the state sufficient time to develop a privatization process.  
The first three companies – LUKoil, Yukos, and Surgutneftgaz – were made up of 
enterprises that voluntarily entered the arrangement. The remaining ob”edineniia either 
could not find a place within one of the first three holding companies or objected to the 
plan all together. The ob”edineniia that composed this group were not centered in a 
specific region, but rather scattered all over Russia, making the prospect of organizing 
them into a successfully operating enterprise virtually prohibitive. Nonetheless, the 
Kremlin ordered the conglomeration of assets grouped into a fourth holding company, a 
hodge-podge to be temporarily controlled by the state. Since the random group of assets 
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had little in common other than being located in Russia, the holding company was given 
the simple name “Russian oil,” otherwise known as “Rosneft.”31  
By establishing the temporary holding company arrangement, Moscow halted the 
centrifugal forces at play in the oil industry. By the mid-1990s, the introduction of 
vertical integration helped stabilize production levels, while the gradual liberalization of 
prices and export quotas engendered enough confidence in the industry that investment 
started to return. However, the three-year holding company mandate ended in 1995. The 
subsequent process of privatization and introduction of foreign partners greatly shaped 
the development of the industry and its relationship with the state for the next decade. 
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Chapter II: Sale of the Century 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When Boris Yeltsin consolidated the oil sector into four temporary holding 
companies in 1992, he set in motion a three-year scramble to consolidate control of the 
industry’s assets. The players involved desperately wanted to be well-positioned in 1995 
when the holding company assets would be auctioned off. With only a couple of notable 
exceptions, the overarching theme of this three-year period was that the neftianiki lost 
control of the oil assets to the young financiers that comprised the emerging oligarch 
class. For the purpose of this study, the emerging group of oil industry oligarchs are 
defined as the liberal, market-minded, financially-savvy reformers outside of government 
that successfully navigated the industry privatization process in order to gain ownership 
of Russia’s oil assets.  
The financiers executed an impressive takeover of the industry. They targeted 
ownership of the profitable oil export permits, leveraged their position in the export 
market to expand their control into the midstream and upstream sectors, and used the 
secondary market to buy up publicly-issued vouchers for the 1995 auction. For added 
insurance, some young oligarchs made timely loans to the debt-ridden Kremlin in order 
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to curry government favor heading into the auctions. Yukos is perhaps the clearest 
example of how the financiers took over Russia’s oil assets. Conversely, LUKoil serves 
as the primary exception to this trend. Its neftianiki leaders pushed to consolidate control 
through vertical integration and thus successfully fended off the oligarch vultures. 
This privatization process was marred by corruption and the influence of the 
emerging class of oligarchs. While two companies, LUKoil and Surgutneftgaz, stayed 
under the control of Soviet-era oilmen, they were the aforementioned exceptions to the 
rule. By and large, the old guard of oilfield managers, the neftianiki, lost ownership of the 
assets they labored to maintain during the centrifugal stage of the early 1990s and the 
holding company stage from 1992 to 1995. This represents a critical pivot point in the 
path of Russian oil industry, most importantly because the market-minded reformers that 
replaced the neftianiki at the helm of the newly privatized industry precipitated a 
significant break from the state.  
The oligarchs asserted control and independence from state influence and desires. 
They hired and fired employees, developed assets according to their own plans, and 
incorporated foreign capital and expertise. Perhaps most egregiously, some of the 
oligarchs sought to take advantage of the immature new tax structure by using loopholes 
and accounting tricks to minimize their tax liabilities. These tactics were known as “tax 
optimization” methods and they sat precariously on the line between legal and illegal 
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activity.32 The process by which the Russian oil industry was privatized set the stage for 
its relationship with the Kremlin for years to come. 
 
Vultures begin to circle 
 
The oligarchs started positioning themselves to take control of oil assets well 
before the official privatization process began. As previously noted, changes in 
Transneft’s business model forced the center of gravity in industry competition from 
upstream production managers further downstream to refiners and exporters. Several 
factors incentivized the ob”edineniia under the management of the regional oil bosses to 
seek to sell their product abroad rather than domestically. For example, the price disparity 
between the two markets created a lucrative arbitrage opportunity for the ob”edineniia 
managers. Additionally, Russia’s economic woes caused oil consumption at home to 
drop, leaving a supply glut in the domestic market that applied additional downward 
pressure on prices. The market environment left the neftianiki scrambling to obtain export 
permits.  
The Foreign Trade Organization, the Soiuznefteeksport, was housed under the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade. While the Soiuznefteeksport never officially ceded the 
authority to manage exports, it lost much of its capacity in the disarray of government 
reorganization and effectively lost its capability to oversee and maintain this process.33 In 
the absence of an orderly export-control system, the Yeltsin government designated 
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favored oil traders known as spetsy to be in charge of purchasing oil on behalf of the 
state, managing export permits, and selling the oil on global markets. The proto-version 
of the oligarch class saw the opportunity to gain influence over one of the most lucrative 
parts of the industry and thus began to establish ties to the spetsy.  
Relationships between the oilfield bosses that controlled the upstream sector and 
the nascent oligarchs that wielded significant influence over the downstream sector 
varied from company to company. Some executives, notably those managing LUKoil and 
Surgutneftgaz, proactively embraced vertical integration, did not become over-leveraged, 
and successfully established footholds in the chaotic downstream sector.34 Their strong 
financial situation and clear corporate control helped them fend off the oligarchs’ 
influence.  
However, many of the neftianiki failed to establish the same level of vertical 
integration and maintain sound finances during the 1992-1995 holding company period. 
Thus, with the spetsy and oligarch class controlling 93% of the crude oil exported by 
Russia,35 the shift in industry power from upstream to downstream necessitated a similar 
shift in power from the neftianiki to the oligarchs. By 1994, the balance of power within 
these companies tilted in favor of the financiers, positioning them well to finish their 
takeover by wresting ownership during the official privatization process. 36 
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Vultures Swoop In 
 
In the early 1990s, Anatolii Chubais was a government official working for the 
State Property Committee. He, along with several reform-minded economists on his 
team, developed and oversaw the official privatization of the oil industry. In order to 
dispel significant broad opposition to the sale of state assets, Chubais distributed free 
vouchers to the public. Each voucher was worth 10,000 rubles, approximately $25 at the 
time, and was meant to be bought and sold on a secondary market and eventually 
exchanged for shares in the new private oil majors.37 The remaining stakes in the 
companies were to be auctioned off. While the plan largely succeeded in mollifying the 
public, the oil bosses were more skeptical. The plan set off a scramble to obtain enough 
vouchers to own a controlling stake in the companies.38 
Recall that while the legislation signed by Yeltsin to halt the fragmentation of the 
oil industry by creating holding companies gave the Kremlin a 45% stake in each, the 
legal arrangement was still quite loose; it did not give the government controlling 
interest, nor did it require that the ob”edineniia bosses relinquish their ownership. This 
created an ambiguous dual level of ownership, first at the consolidated level of the 
holding company, and second at the de facto subsidiary level of the ob”edineniia. Since 
the ob”edineniia were technically legally autonomous, their privatization auctions ran in 
parallel with the ‘parent’ holding companies, creating both risk and opportunity for the 
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holding company executives seeking to transition their management of a loose 
association of assets to firm ownership of a vertically integrated company.  
On one hand, the executives feared that the ob”edineniia would cobble together 
sufficient stake in the subsidiary auctions to acquire de facto veto power over the 
decisions of the parent company within which the subsidiary asset was housed. On the 
other hand, the executives saw an opportunity to use their connections to the State 
Privatization Committee, the Gosudarstvennyi Kommitet Imushchestva (GKI), to 
purchase enough vouchers on the secondary market to establish ironclad control over the 
parent companies and their ob”edineniia subsidiaries. However, successfully acquiring 
sufficient vouchers required knowledge of finance and markets, an area of expertise best 
found in the emerging oligarchs. Executives that partnered with inexperienced or, even 
worse, nefarious advisors did not cement control over their assets as they wanted. Instead, 
many of them fell into debt and had to appeal to their oligarch advisors for financial 
support in return for greater stake in their companies.  
The emerging oligarchs had another aspect to their plan. It was not only the oil 
companies that were in financial dire straits; the Russian government was in trouble of its 
own. Sensing the state’s weakness, the financiers used their access to capital to provide 
rapid cash injections into state coffers. Author Martin Sixsmith notes that in one instance 
on March 30, 1995, two tycoons, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Vladimir Potanin, offered 
the equivalent of $1.8 billion to President Boris Yeltsin in return for the right of first 
refusal at state asset auctions. It was, in effect, private citizens offering loans in return for 
preferred access to shares of state assets. It became known as the loans-for-shares 
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scheme.39 Other financiers, seeing that the shares were undervalued, bought many of 
them very cheaply.  This privatization process cemented the transfer of state assets to the 
emerging oligarchs. Only the oil companies that consolidated ownership quickly – 
LUKoil and Surgutneftgaz – avoided being included in the loans-for-shares scheme that 
saw their assets sold to the oligarchs for pennies on the dollar when the voucher auction 
completed.40 
The voucher auction was intended to ensure that the public-at-large felt included 
in the process and realized some benefit from the privatization of the state’s vast oil 
assets. Remarkably, a handful of the richest new financial barons navigated the process 
through skill and influence to grow their personal wealth beyond imagination and as 
such, graduated from nascent financiers to full-fledged oligarchs. In this sense, the early 
1990s – marked by the scramble for export permits and loans – exposed many 
traditionally technically-minded executives and oil bosses as unprepared for the transition 
to a market-based, financiers’ world. This process shaped the industry and colored the 
legitimacy of the oligarchs in the eyes of the public and the Kremlin.  
 
LUKoil and Yukos: Case Studies in Differing Privatization Paths 
 
Each company pursued its own strategy through the privatization process, leading 
to markedly different results. Of the four big holding companies created by Boris Yeltsin 
in 1992, two of them, LUKoil and Yukos, represent almost polar opposite strategies, 
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leading to very different outcomes. LUKoil maintained a decent relationship with the 
government and stayed in the hands of the neftianiki. While Surgutneftgaz followed a 
similar path, LUKoil led the way in this strategy and as such offers a particularly valuable 
example. In contrast, Yukos took a different tack. Its managers seemed to purposefully 
and shamelessly antagonize the Kremlin. The fourth holding company, Rosneft, will be 
discussed later in this study, as it took on a life of its own. 
LUKoil is perhaps the greatest success story that came out of the privatization 
process. This is largely due to keen foresight and astute management. LUKoil was 
managed by Vagit Alekperov, the very brains behind the 1992 decree that created it. 
Alekperov learned the nuances of the financial industry quickly, allowing him to resist 
relying on the oligarchs for support where others in the Soviet old guard could not. He 
quickly realized that in a market economy the key to a company’s value is not necessarily 
the strict monetary value of its assets, but the holistic value of the company itself. That is, 
intangibles such as steady management and cohesiveness in and of themselves increase 
the stock price. As such, Alekperov saw that the best way to maintain his management 
position – thereby increasing his own wealth – was not to be greedy and hoard stake in 
the company, but instead to spread shares around to key players. By making sure that the 
managers of the subsidiary enterprises that fell under LUKoil had financial skin in the 
game, he stifled their desires to more forcefully assert themselves. They too understood 
that having Alekperov’s hand on the tiller helped buoy the LUKoil stock price and thus 
their own bank accounts.41 
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In addition to staving off internal power struggles, LUKoil needed to establish the 
financial wherewithal to survive the privatization auctions. One key aspect of this was 
vertically integrating the company’s ownership and operations to increase profitability. 
As noted earlier, there were two levels of ownership in the holding companies, the top 
executive level and the ob”edineniia subsidiary level. The upstream sector was largely 
under the control of LUKoil’s executives. As such, practically speaking, vertical 
integration meant asserting control over the ob”edineniia managers, exports, and retail 
sales. In 1993 and 1994, the oil companies were still required to deliver certain 
percentages of their production to the domestic market. However, given the pervasive 
turmoil of the changing economy, customers often simply failed to pay. With debt 
growing just as LUKoil needed to firm up its cash base, Alekperov required customers to 
open an account at the bank through which LUKoil worked and prepay for deliveries. In 
return, LUKoil offered discounted prices. This strategy allowed LUKoil to muster the 
financial resources to generously compensate those in charge of its ob”edineniia 
subsidiaries, staving off a potentially ruinous ownership fight.42 
Alekperov also pursued a strategy for the upstream sector. A native of Azerbaijan, 
Alekperov saw the territory’s recent independence as an opportunity the diversify 
LUKoil’s asset base abroad. While Azerbaijan’s new President, Heydar Aliyev, was 
skeptical of allowing a Russian company, however separate from the Kremlin, to gain 
significant influence in the country’s large offshore resource base, he did allow some 
involvement. LUKoil thus took a 10% stake in the newly formed Azerbaijan International 
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Oil Consortium (AIOC).43 By 1996, LUKoil had acquired interest in various plays44 
throughout the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and North Africa.45  
In addition to deftly navigating the upstream landscape through diversification of 
LUKoil’s assets, Alekperov also carefully monitored the opinions of the industry within 
the Kremlin. As a member of the Soviet oil industry, Alekperov understood how 
important oil was to the state and that it was Moscow that ultimately owned everything 
from the resources in the ground, to the pipelines traversing the vast Russian landscape, 
to the export permits needed to access markets. Perhaps most importantly, the bureaucrats 
in Moscow still envisaged oil as a tool of foreign policy. This understanding of the 
government relationship helped inform Alekperov’s decision not to take part in the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, a project that seemed a Trojan horse for Western influence and 
rustled feathers in the Kremlin.46 Through this strategy, Alekperov kept LUKoil from the 
oligarchs, grew its value, and stayed on good terms with the state.  
While LUKoil exemplified a unique neftianiki success story, Yukos proved 
demonstrative of the oil bosses’ broader inability to maintain control through 
privatization. The first president of Yukos was Sergei Muravlenko, a well-known oil 
manager from West Siberia. Muravlenko’s father was well known in the oil industry for 
discovering vast oil deposits in West Siberia and being the first head of production in the 
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Tiumen region. His son’s career path followed the traditional Soviet track through 
technical training at the Tiumen Industrial Institute and up through the Soviet oil 
technocracy. In 1988, Muvalenko was named general director of Yuganskneftgaz, one of 
the largest and most profitable oil companies in West Siberia. Muravlenko was 
technically savvy, but lacked the ruthlessness to be an effective manager in the 
roughshod, relationship-driven environment of the Soviet oil industry. This weakness was 
particularly apparent in the chaos of industry privatization.47 
In the early 1990s, Muravlenko recognized that some of the NGDU-level assets 
underneath him wanted independence from Yuganskneftgaz. One of these assets, the 
Priobskoe field, was massive. While not in production at the time, maintaining control of 
Priobskoe was still critical. The field was tremendously valuable and, in fact, is still one 
of the top producing fields in Russia today, over twenty-five years later.48 Muravlenko 
tried to pursue the same strategy of vertical integration as Vagit Alekperov at LUKoil by 
purchasing a downstream component, the Samara refinery group. After the purchase, 
Muravlenko renamed the new company Yukos.  
In its early years, Yukos lacked structure and direction from its management. The 
Samara refinery group had internal conflicts that became Yukos’ problem after the 
purchase. This gave Muravlenko additional friction to worry about. Meanwhile, the 
financial advisors on the Yukos team proved to be inept, leaving the company without a 
coherent strategy. The downstream dysfunction hindered the company’s ability to shore 
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up cash flow, which in turn prevented the management from having the resources needed 
to acquire the shares that were owned at the NGDU level. Without consolidating 
ownership of the NGDU subsidiary assets, Muravlenko postponed offering shares in the 
Yukos parent company, fearing his weak position would lead to a broader takeover. 
Unfortunately, without issuing shares, Yukos severely lacked capital.49  
By 1994, Yukos was in chaos. Yuganskneftgaz, still Yukos’ largest upstream 
entity, could only operate 54% of its wells, with the other 46% either broken or shut-in. 
Management simply did not have the funds to repair them.50 In addition to flagging 
production, organized crime pervaded the downstream operations of Samara, hurting the 
company’s revenue stream even further.51 Eventually, Yukos could not pay its suppliers, 
workers, or, worst of all, its taxes. In a last ditch effort to save the company, Muravlenko 
entered into an agreement with Amoco to develop the prized Priobskoe field. The 
complex geology of Priobskoe and a preponderance of more easily developable plays 
kept Soviet oilmen from developing Priobskoe previously, resulting in a need for foreign 
technology in addition to project capital. However, the agreement signed by Muravlenko 
allowed Amoco to, in industry jargon, recover cost oil before Yukos could benefit from 
profit oil. In laymen’s terms, the contract allowed Amoco to recover its capital 
expenditures on the project through product sales before Yukos would experience any 
profit.  
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This did little to help Yukos’ pressing cash shortage. Indeed, the agreement was 
not lucrative enough soon enough for Muravlenko to maintain control of the company. 
His inability to secure Yukos’ revenue stream and consolidate ownership made the 
company a prime target for takeover. Yukos was auctioned off on December 8, 1995. 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, one of the two financiers who extended a loan to the state in 
March 1995 used the opportunity and the favor he curried with President Yeltsin to 
purchase 78% of Yukos through a shell company for just over $309 million.52 
 
Conclusion 
 
The government effort to halt the centrifugal forces tearing apart the oil industry 
in the early 1990s represented good intentions and astute crisis management. However, in 
the three years between the formation of the four holding companies in 1992 and the oil 
asset auction in 1995, the holding companies took wildly different paths. LUKoil was 
able to quickly consolidate ownership by rectifying poor cash flows, proving to be one of 
the few examples of neftianiki success during this time period. Nonetheless, the inability 
of the vast majority of the oil bosses to quickly grasp important finance and free market 
concepts paved the way for increased influence of the oligarchs, the most glaring 
example of this failure being the takeover of Yukos by Mikhail Khodorkovsky. As the 
industry developed over the next several years, many factors influenced the relationship 
between the private companies and the state. However, the corrupt nature of the 
privatization process never fully left the minds of those controlling the Kremlin. 
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Chapter III: Growing Pains (1996-1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After the Russian state auctioned off its oil assets, management of the new private 
companies turned its focus toward increasing profitability. As reform-minded financiers – 
members of the new oligarch class – the owners understood the benefits of engaging with 
foreign oil companies and oil service firms. Executives believed they could increase the 
hard value of their assets by bringing in physical improvements such as advanced drilling 
technology and oilfield management expertise. Additionally, they believed that working 
with Westerners would further boost stock prices by lending credibility to their 
exploration and development projects despite the uncertainty of the Russian business 
landscape at the time. However, the introduction of Western companies into the Russian 
oil sector uncovered a chasm in how the two industries developed over several decades of 
separation.  
Many Western oil companies believed that the Russian companies would prove 
great partners that were open to learning how to increase the profitability of their 
operations. This was mostly true at the executive level. However, relationships at the 
working level were fraught with much more consternation. The Westerners 
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underestimated the cultural differences between themselves and their new business 
associates. Old Soviet pride died hard, and the influx of brash Texans arriving en masse 
to show a proud Russian oil workforce how to best develop and manage its resources 
proved to exacerbate an already difficult business environment. This chapter elucidates 
the early years of the privatized Russian oil industry, and specifically how the 
fundamental differences between the Russian and Western players regarding how to 
manage the oil resources led to macro-level difficulty in industry development and 
relations with the state.  
 
Same Oil. Different Business. 
 
Broadly speaking, the reasons why the Western and Russian oil industries 
developed so differently in the 20th century can be grouped into two categories: 
technological development and the incentive structure of the command economy. 
Throughout the history of oil production in Russia, exploration and production were 
relatively easy.53 The industry progressed from one region with plentiful, easily-
accessible oil to the next. The first region was in modern day Azerbaijan. The strategic 
value of the oil resources of the South Caucasus played a key role in Adolf Hitler’s 
decision to pursue Operation Barbarossa and invade the Soviet Union during World War 
II.54 However, as demand grew and production from around Baku subsided, the Soviets 
found a prime replacement in the Volga-Urals region. Here, the industry found similarly 
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favorable geology and operation conditions. Geologists soon found expansive resources 
in the region adjacent to the Volga-Urals, West Siberia. For the last half-century, West 
Siberia has been the central locus of Soviet oil production. 55   
The Soviet Union boasted significant technical and scientific prowess. However, 
due to the abundance of such favorable geology, Soviet oilmen did not have much of an 
impetus to develop advanced extraction technology or analytics.56 The extent of the 
technological gap between Russia and the West was not fully realized until the 1990s. A 
1992 U.S. government survey of the Russian oil industry found that productivity across 
the board was between 10 and 30 percent of Western levels.57 This was unimaginable to 
some of the U.S. industry consultants involved in the project. In the report, some of the 
consultants found equipment donated to the Soviet Union under the Lend-Lease Act and 
analog wire-line equipment that the West had replaced with digital tools over two 
decades earlier.58 The most critical technological difference was in exploration. The 
Russians severely lacked seismic technology and the computing power needed for large-
scale data processing. This resulted in a significantly lower success rate for wells sunk. In 
fact, the U.S. government-commissioned report found that the number of barrels of oil 
discovered per kilometer of seismic survey was about one-fifth of the global average.59 
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Figure 2: Regions of Oil and Natural Gas Production in Russia 
    Source: United States Energy Information Administration, 2014. 
    http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=18051. 
 
The dearth of technological innovation was not the only significant factor in 
stifling the development and productivity of the oil industry during the Soviet era. In fact, 
perhaps an even larger factor was the distorted incentive structure of the command 
economy. As previously noted, the industry was strictly managed from the upper ranks of 
the Kremlin. This created a great deal of waste. For example, a common Soviet metric for 
oil industry success was not barrels of oil produced, but meters of well drilled. As a 
result, drilling was not a means to an end, but practically an end in and of itself. 
Compounded with inadequate reservoir modeling and well logging, oilmen drilled a 
staggering number of wells that punched straight through oil-bearing rock without 
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realizing it. With drilling as a primary metric, many wells were drilled and cased, but 
never perforated or produced.60 
During the Soviet era, the oil industry was, first and foremost, a tool of the state. 
This affected the development of the oil industry by skewing production incentives; 
targets were dictated by bureaucrats more interested in meeting policy goals than 
maintaining the long-term value and sustainability of the oilfields. The conflict between 
state goals and industry health appeared in stark relief in the latter half of the 1980s. 
Crude oil prices reached $87.65 (2005 prices) in 1980. In 1986, they fell to $25.63 and 
more or less remained between $25 and $35 from 1986 to 1992.61 During this period, in 
an example of the state imposing production strategy on the oil industry, the Kremlin 
demanded more production in order to make up for the loss in revenue per barrel. 
Petroleum engineers needed to find a way to extract much more oil out of their inefficient 
wells. The result was excessive waterflooding.  
Waterflooding is a technique in which water is pumped into injector wells that are 
drilled adjacent to production wells in order to create a wall of water that pushes oil 
toward the production wells. When used properly, water injection is a valuable enhanced 
recovery technique. However, when used without appropriate reservoir analytics in order 
to hastily and drastically increase production, waterflooding can severely damage wells. 
Though waterflooding does not create artificial fractures like fracking, the injected water 
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can seep through naturally-occurring fractures in the source rock and lead to an ever-
increasing percentage of water recovered with the oil.62 By one estimate, waterflooding 
left 80% of Russian wells contaminated.63 That sort of damage was not inflicted upon 
wells in the West because the main driver of production was profit, not achieving the 
policy objectives of the state. The differences in technology and industry incentives 
reveal two particularly broad or ‘macro-level’ tensions between the Russian oil 
companies and the Western oilmen: damaged egos and investment instability.   
 
Macro-level Tensions 
 
When the Russian oil industry opened up to Western involvement, the foreign oil 
workers created significant tension between themselves and the Soviet oilmen by not 
being cognizant of the natives’ pride. The Soviet oilmen developed a level of geological 
knowledge similar to their Western counterparts despite a lack of advanced tools.64 They 
worked in a successful industry of strategic importance that afforded them a laudable 
reputation in their communities. However, the Western oilmen viewed the oil industry in 
Russia very differently. After seeing the outdated technology and wildly inefficient 
practices, the Westerners were quick to recommend sweeping changes. They were 
incredulous at the level of waste, with one Western intelligence service even producing 
an analysis comparing the oil Russian oil industry to that of an impoverished West 
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African country.65 The brash attitudes of the foreigners betrayed their true feelings hiding 
behind a thin veneer of insincere politeness. In the wake of the humiliating collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Russian oilmen swallowed their pride in order to access much needed 
equipment and expertise. However, as author Thane Gustafson explains, their willingness 
to be treated as “a defeated country, wide open for sale”66 had limits.  
The second macro-level tension between Russia and the West was the poor 
investment climate. When the Iron Curtain fell, Russia was just one of many countries 
that became open for new investment. Azerbaijan invited Western majors to participate in 
the development of offshore plays in the Caspian while Kazakhstan sought investment in 
its massive Tengiz field.67 These fields offered intriguing, new reserves that allowed 
foreign majors to get in on the ground floor. The issues with these plays were primarily 
geological.  
Conversely, the Russian investment opportunities were onshore in the Volga-
Urals region and West Siberia. The reservoirs were well understood and in many cases 
already producing. As such, the primary investment risks in Russia were not geological, 
but political. The Western executives felt that investing large sums of money into finding 
technical solutions could solve the geological problems characterizing the Azerbaijani 
and Kazakh plays. Meanwhile, the non-technical concerns in the Russian market required 
the companies to build relationships, a time-consuming process. Furthermore, without 
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confidence in the rule of law or a contract arbitration system, Western executives 
perceived an increased risk of asset expropriation. 
Another factor that contributed to the initial investment calculus of the Western 
majors was ease of export. The former Soviet republics, located on the Russian periphery, 
offered access to an existing network of oil and gas pipelines and relatively short 
distances to export markets. Russian fields, particularly those located in West Siberia, 
were remote and necessitated the use of the Transneft pipeline infrastructure. This was 
highly undesirable due to the fact that the Russian government owned Transneft and 
controlled access to both the physically-limited capacity of the infrastructure and the 
permits required for export.  As a result, the newly independent former Soviet republics 
attracted significantly greater initial investment from Western companies than did 
Russia.68 
Western companies seeking to invest in Russia also experienced instability and 
informality in the business environment. Navigating this required strong relationships 
with and guidance from government officials. In a country with such complicated, 
opaque politics and informal patronage networks, this was incredibly difficult. Some 
Westerners relied on the smaller, more easily navigable, regional governments. However, 
the frequently changing authorities did not mollify the investment instability. Of course, 
working with the Kremlin was no better. The various players in Moscow made pursuing 
business deals there fraught with personal tensions and conflicting political interests. As 
frustrating as it was for the Western companies to navigate the conflicts between the 
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various Russian interest groups, it was even more difficult to overcome the one thing that 
unified the Russians: an intense skepticism of the West. Thane Gustafson elucidates this 
fact through a Russian saying: “He who interferes in a fight between brothers will be 
beaten by both, and rightly.”69 
Aside from navigating the network of complex relationships, Western companies 
struggled to gain clarity and confidence regarding the tax structure covering their 
business deals. The Westerners wanted the Kremlin to approve the use of production 
sharing agreements (PSAs) as the standard form of contract used. PSAs offered several 
advantages to the Westerners, including the ability to use outside (e.g. United States) 
legal jurisdiction for tax and property law purposes, and the right – as previously noted – 
to recover cost oil. The Kremlin opposed the use of PSAs because they were generally 
the types of contracts that were used when doing business in countries with high 
“political” risk. While Russia resented being treated as a third world country, there was 
also a more practical reason for their reluctance to grant PSAs; Russia needed to increase 
its oil revenue quickly. If the Kremlin allowed the Westerners to recover cost oil in order 
to offset the risk of their investment, Russia would have to wait years to see any 
significant payback from the projects. This was simply a non-starter for a cash-strapped 
Russian state.70 
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Conclusion 
 
The influx of Western involvement that occurred in the wake of the privatization 
of the Russian oil industry exposed two very different oil industries. Despite a similarly 
talented technical workforce and favorable geology, the top-down nature of the command 
economy removed any significant impetus for the Russian oil industry to develop new 
technology or operate efficiently. The result was an oil industry in tatters. In 1989 alone, 
51 million barrels of oil leaked into rivers simply because the government could not be 
bothered to repair corroded pipes.71 Western majors saw the newly privatized Russian 
market as a tremendous opportunity for a mutually beneficial relationship. However, 
cultural differences and open Cold War wounds led to damaged pride while nebulous 
property rights and tax laws created an unstable business environment.  
These macro-level tensions permeated the industry relationships in the early years 
of the private Russian oil industry. When Russian oil production bottomed out in 1997 
falling to approximately half of the Soviet-era peak,72 suspicion in the Kremlin regarding 
Western involvement in the industry only grew. What happened next to the Russian 
economy proved to be another critical pivot point in the minds of those skeptical leaders, 
one that significantly altered the course of the Russian oil industry and its relationship to 
the state. 
 
 
 
																																																						
71 Bower, Tom. Oil: Money, Politics, and Power in the 21st Century. New York: Grand Central Pub., 2009. 
94. 
72 Gustafson, Thane. Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and Power in Russia. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2012. 183. 
	43	
Chapter IV: From Challenge to Chudo (1998-2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The adversity faced by Russian oil throughout the privatization process and the 
introduction of Western companies in the mid-1990s was nothing compared to the tumult 
of the late-1990s and early-2000s. During that period, the Russian oil industry followed a 
similar trajectory to the broader economy: a challenging collapse to rock bottom followed 
by a miraculous comeback, or chudo, in Russian. The stagnation of oil production, fall 
into economic recession, and the ultimate recovery of both are critical to understanding 
the further development of the relationship between the Russian oil industry and the state. 
 
Challenge 
 
In 1996 and 1997, the Kremlin was optimistic about the economic prospects of 
the country. Despite a lethargic oil industry, the trade imbalance was moving from deficit 
to surplus; relationships with the World Trade Organization (WTO) and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) were strengthening, with the former agreeing to provide $2-$3 
billion in aid per year; inflation fell from 131% in 1995 to 22% in 1996; and the ruble 
remained stable through a tight currency band pegged to the U.S. dollar. Additionally, 
Russia came to terms on renegotiating the repayment schedule of tens of billions of 
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dollars borrowed during the Soviet era.73 Russia’s increased integration into the global 
financial system provided reasons for long-term optimism. However optimistic, the 
Russian economy was still weak and the same integration into the global economy also 
exposed Russia to the risks of financial tumult in previously far-flung regions of the 
world. 
That vulnerability to economic disorder bore fruit in the form of the “Asian Flu.” 
In July 1997, a lending bubble that built over-confidence in several emerging markets in 
Asia burst. The capital flight that began with a run on the Thai baht spread throughout 
Asia, sending other countries such as Malaysia, Hong Kong, and the Philippines into 
recession.74 In November 1997, currency speculators lost faith in the ruble, causing the 
Kremlin to spend $6 billion in foreign reserves to prop up the economy. As the tumult 
spread further from its source region, the global economy slowed down, leading to a drop 
in demand for raw materials, including metals and oil, industries that accounted for two-
thirds of the Russian economy.75 In December 1997, these commodity prices plummeted, 
hitting Russia particularly hard.  
1998 was an extremely difficult year for the Russian economy. From May to 
August, capital flight totaled $4 billion on rumors of an impending ruble devaluation 
from the Russian central bank. An additional $4 billion in revenue was lost in the same 
time frame due to flagging oil prices, which averaged $12 per barrel, half the price of the 
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previous year. Revenues flowing into the Russian treasury slowed to a trickle, falling 
almost 40% in just two years, from $23 billion in 1996 to $14 billion in 1998.76 On 
August 17, 1998, the Russian economy collapsed. Yields on ruble-denominated bonds 
reached 200% and the government was forced to abandon the currency band and devalue 
the ruble. The decision capped an eight-month period beginning in January that saw the 
Russian stock market lose more than 75% of its value.77 The Kremlin could not continue 
to finance its budget deficits. Each day, the treasury was searching for new lenders 
simply to find the liquidity to pay off earlier lenders.78 The result was a devastating 
government default.   
Liberals and conservatives in the government drew very different lessons from the 
collapse. While liberals took the default as impetus to open and strengthen markets 
further, conservatives came to the opposite conclusion. They perceived a failing of 
several Western ideas and institutions. For example, the IMF left Russia after failing to 
reach an austerity agreement. The Central Bank of Russia lacked the liquidity it needed to 
purchase its own government bonds in part because the state recently reorganized the 
treasury system to mirror the United States.79 For conservatives, the collapse of the 
economy represented not just growing pains for a new market economy, but the failure of 
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the capitalist experiment itself. This skepticism contributed to their desire to revert to 
centralized state control of the economy.  
As the conservatives in the Kremlin who were historically skeptical of Western 
involvement in the oil sector looked out over the landscape of the Russian economy, they 
observed two things: an oil industry whose production plummeted by 40% during the 
first eight years of growing Western involvement from 1990 to 1998; and an economy in 
ruin.80 Where was the oil and money that was supposed to result from Western 
technology and business acumen? The recently-appointed Prime Minister, Vladimir 
Putin, viewed western economic advice and, to a certain extent, western oilfield 
management advice, as a Trojan horse being used to wreak havoc on Russia and cement 
U.S. economic and global superiority.  
 
The Economy Turns Around 
 
The 1998 sovereign debt default was catastrophic for many aspects of the Russian 
economy. However, it was not without a silver lining. If the Russian economy in the mid-
1990s suffered from a fever, the default and subsequent rapid devaluation of the ruble 
represented the moment that fever broke. The debt held by Russian oil companies was 
primarily denominated in rubles. When the Kremlin defaulted on $40 billion of foreign 
debt and floated the currency, the ruble devalued fourfold. The devaluation alone 
amounted to a de facto 75% cut in the liabilities of Russian oil companies almost 
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overnight.81 Simultaneously, the price of oil quickly rebounded due to shifts in the global 
market, almost tripling from $12 per barrel in 1998 to $33 per barrel in 2000.82  
The effects of this turnaround cannot be overstated. In 1998, Russia brought in 
$74 billion in export revenues, with $28 billion (38%) coming from oil and natural gas. 
Just seven years later in 2005, total export revenue increased over three times to $243 
billion, of which $143 billion (59%) was the result of oil and natural gas sales.83 In 2006, 
Russia pumped more oil than Saudi Arabia. By 2007, less than a decade after chaos and 
default, the Kremlin boasted the third largest reserves of foreign currency and gold, with 
$420 billion in the treasury.84 
Aside from helping the economy turnaround quickly, the devalued ruble and 
rising oil prices provided an influx of cash to the industry that allowed for much needed 
capital investment. Due to the damage done to oilfields throughout the Soviet era, the 
first sector that Western companies targeted for rehabilitation were the brownfields. To 
do so, the industry used the cash dividend from the economic recovery to invest in and 
employ Western technologies and oilfield management practices. This process was 
wrought with conflict, perhaps a battle foreshadowed by the post-privatization/pre-
recession macro-level tensions between the market-minded oligarchs with Western 
support and the old guard neftianiki with state backing. The deep integration of Western 
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technology and business practices needed to arrest the decline in oil production was 
almost antithetical to the Soviet legacy oil workers and conservatives in government. The 
most useful and illustrative example of both the benefits of Western involvement and the 
conflict with the state is the only company to quickly and fully institute Western 
practices: Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Yukos.  
 
The Anatomy of a ‘Chudo’ 
 
Throughout late 1997 and most of 1998, Yukos was at risk of failure. Its balance 
sheet reflected the aforementioned ruble depreciation dividend, but with historically low 
oil prices and poorly performing assets, Khodorkovsky did not have revenue to pay his 
employees or his taxes. One industry expert close to Yukos in 1999 recalled that 
Khodorkovsky paid his employees in television sets and used questionable tactics to limit 
his tax obligations. He needed to increase Yukos’ oil production. In October 1998, 
Khodorkovsky signed a contract with the Western oil service company Schlumberger. 
Under this arrangement, the opportunity to advise and manage Yukos was virtually carte 
blanche. Not only did Schlumberger provide equipment and technical expertise, it also 
reformed business operations and personnel decisions. 
The person sent by Schlumberger to institute these changes was Joe Mach, a 
seasoned industry expert with an oversized personality. Mach used computers to monitor 
well pressure and flow rates throughout the entire reservoir in order to determine 
precisely where, at what “nodes,” production bottlenecks occurred. This strategy allowed 
Schlumberger to offer Yukos a detailed report on the state of its assets and 
recommendations for specific tactics to employ in each well. Furthermore, with this nodal 
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analysis, Yukos catalogued and compared the actual measurements at all the wells to 
their theoretical production potential to determine their “performance gaps.” This allowed 
Mach to not only suggest a course of action for each well, but to also rank in order the 
wells that should be targeted first. Schlumberger recommended three broad technical 
courses of action for Yukos: installing more powerful well pumps, using more advanced 
hydraulic fracturing (fracking), and reversing the damage from waterflooding. The wells 
with the largest performance gaps were targeted first. 85 
Throughout the Soviet era, petroleum engineers injected water into wells as a 
standard secondary recovery method. When the proportion of water to oil became too 
high, the Soviets installed electrical submersible pumps (ESPs) in order to drive oil up 
the wellbore more cost effectively. Over time, these pumps became ubiquitous 
throughout West Siberia.86 By the time Schlumberger arrived, the ESPs were grossly 
outdated for two reasons: first, they were not powerful enough to be effective, and 
second, they failed under high heat, thus precluding them from being set as deep in the 
well as they needed to be.  
Prior to the 1998 default, new Western ESPs were prohibitively expensive, 
around $80,000 per unit. After the ruble devalued, the price of Russian-made ESPs 
plummeted to the equivalent of $10,000 per unit since they were valued in cheaper 
rubles. However, after a decade of atrophy, Russian manufacturers did not have the 
capacity to retool and make Western-quality pumps. The oil companies decided to step in 
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and invest in the domestic pump manufacturers. Between 2000 and 2003, the Russian 
ESP makers increased the quality of their products and capacity for production enough to 
provide over 50,000 new pumps for domestic use, replacing almost all of the Soviet-era 
machinery. 87 
Mach met resistance in his plan for Yukos’ pumps on two fronts. First, he 
demanded that the old pumps be lowered deeper into the wells. This order was met with 
consternation from the oil workers who knew that their ESPs were not designed to 
operate under that level of heat and pressure. Many pumps failed, but those that remained 
operational were more effective and thus largely made up for the ESPs that succumbed to 
stress. Second, Mach used the new Western ESPs in a way that ran contrary to a core 
Soviet era operating practice. ESPs cause the pressure at the bottom of the reservoir, 
below the pump, to drop. This can induce the natural gas that is dissolved in the oil 
(associated gas) to separate from the oil and bubble up to the top. Without the associated 
gas mixed in the oil, the well pressure drops, cutting oil production substantially. As 
such, the Soviet oil management prohibited ESPs to be used in such a way that the well 
reached the “bubble point.” To this effect, fear of state repercussions deterred Soviet oil 
workers from operating their machinery anywhere near the bubble point.  
However, the Schlumberger technicians under Mach used more advanced 
technology and analytics than the Soviets ever had, allowing them to operate the more 
powerful ESPs at or slightly below the bubble point. The old Soviet workers were 
horrified by the foreigners running the pump so close to the bubble point. Historically, 
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even coming close to it was seen as too risky and could elicit punishment from the 
obkom. Consequently, while the use of analytics and stronger pumps increased overall 
production, the strategy still induced significant resentment from old guard management 
afraid of consequences from the state.88  
In addition to purchasing better pumps, Schlumberger wanted to drastically 
increase the use of fracking. Traditionally, the Soviets fracked simply in order to break 
through layers of particularly hard cap rock and induce oil to flow to the wellbore. These 
“skin fracks” used approximately four to ten tons of proppant per frack and did not 
extend very far. Under Schlumberger’s control, Yukos began fracking with up to 500 
tons of proppant, creating fracks over hundreds of yards in length. Fracking on this scale 
might as well have been an alien concept to the oil workers at Yukos. Many of them, as 
well as Yukos’ competitors, were furious at Schlumberger for instituting, and 
Khodorkovsky for allowing, this practice. They likened the super-fracks to carpet-
bombing. 
Finally, Joe Mach tackled the problem of waterflooding. Waterflooding is an old 
technique that was used by U.S. oil producers for decades. As previously discussed, the 
theory underpinning waterflooding is sound. The primary issue with the technique is that 
it is difficult to execute without advanced analytics. Without the proper data, Soviet 
waterflooding essentially involved surrounding a production well with several wells into 
which water was injected in order to drive the oil toward the center production well. This 
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crude design, dubbed the “Siberian box,” created significant production losses and led to 
water breaking through into the oil reservoir and contaminating the production well.  
The Schlumberger team found that the wells with botched waterfloods operated at 
less than 8% of their theoretical production potential. Those wells not only produced 
more water than oil, but also were tantamount to parasites, damaging the production of 
neighboring wells. In order to mitigate the damage done from the waterflooding at 
Yukos, Schlumberger used three-dimensional seismic data to determine which wells were 
acting as parasites and then modeling how shutting them in might increase well pressure, 
and thus production. 89  
The Western recommendations worked. By 1999, Yukos was leading the Russian 
oil industry, boasting great steps forward in production, efficiency, and profitability. 
From 1998 to 2000, Yukos cut production costs by two-thirds.90 From 1997 to 2002, 
Yukos doubled the average flow rates from its wells, while the rest of the Russian oil 
industry only managed a 14% increase. Yukos’ new wells produced spectacular results. 
Each new Yukos well produced on average 918 barrels per day, a staggering figure 
compared to the 294 barrels per day seen by new wells across the rest of the industry. By 
2002, Yukos’ lifting costs91 were approximately $1.47 per barrel, a full 40% lower than 
its nearest competitor, LUKoil, whose lifting costs were around $2.50 per barrel.92 
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Figure 3: Oil Production by Company, 1995-2011 (million metric tons) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Russian 
Federation, total 
307 301 306 303 305 323 348 380 421 459 470 481 491 488 494 505 511 
Rosneft 12 13 13 13 12 13 14 15 19 22 74 82 110 114 106 112 114 
LUKoil 58 54 57 57 59 62 72 74 72 84 88 86 91 88 92 90 85 
TNK-BP n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 70 75 84 80 79 80 81 82 
Surgutneftgaz 33 33 34 35 36 41 44 49 54 60 64 66 64 62 60 60 61 
Gazprom Neft 20 19 18 17 16 17 21 26 31 34 33 44 43 41 39 39 39 
Tatneft 25 25 25 24 24 24 25 25 25 25 25 25 26 26 26 26 26 
Slavneft 13 13 13 12 12 12 14 15 18 22 24 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bashneft 18 16 15 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 14 15 
Gazprom 9 9 9 9 10 10 10 11 11 12 13 13 13 13 11 14 15 
Russneft n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 7 12 15 14 14 13 13 14 
TNK 28 25 24 22 23 29 34 38 43 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Sidanco 18 15 15 16 16 16 16 16 19 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Onako 8 8 8 8 8 8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Yukos 47 46 47 45 44 50 58 70 81 86 25 22 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: Russian Ministry of Energy found in Gustafson, Thane. Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and Power in Russia. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2012. 195. 
n.a.: Not Applicable (company not in existence or acquired by other company or companies). 
Shading font indicates years that a given company was controlled by the state. 
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The strategy yielded results, but not without again stirring the pot. As was seen 
with the ESP strategy, any plan that the oil workers feared would decrease production, 
however unfounded, was met with fierce skepticism. This remained the case even though 
the strategy increased overall production. The Soviet era workers believed that such 
strategies would elicit reprisals from the managers in the government bureaucracy. In the 
case of shutting in wells, the old guard had a point. Not only was this practice 
controversial, it was illegal. One legacy policy from the Soviet era that remained in 
Russia was that oil companies could not deviate from the oilfield development plan that 
had to be filed with the government. In this vein, the Western changes instituted at Yukos 
challenged very deeply entrenched views on not only how to best develop oil resources, 
but the state’s final authority over the industry. 
 
Tensions Rise 
 
If the macro-level tensions that colored the post-privatization/pre-recession period 
from 1995 to 1998 revolved around tax regimes and broad issues of pride, the conflicts of 
the full Western integration into the industry stemmed from operational disagreements. 
These seemingly mundane decisions proved to be anathema to the Soviet legacy 
workforce and conservatives in the Kremlin. Western operational strategies exposed 
cultural differences much more fundamental than the issues that plagued the PSA 
negotiations. Yukos and its Western partners instituted a regime of transparency, 
prioritized cash flows over workers, and did so with irreverent swagger. 
Khodorkovsky understood that efficiency was paramount to the survival of the 
company, a concept that Soviet-era workers never grappled with since the government 
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underwrote their operations. In order to ensure that Yukos operated as efficiently as 
possible, Khodorkovsky had to eliminate theft and fraud. To do so, he put in place a 
system that recorded and displayed the flows from each well and throughout the 
company’s production network in real time. This terrified the Yukos workers that had 
come up in the Soviet system. Throughout their careers, these Soviet petroleum engineers 
and mid-level managers kept full production data very close to their chests and away 
from the managers in the regional and Kremlin bureaucracies. This helped them 
manipulate figures and avoid reprisals when production did not meet mandates from the 
state. After all, data that revealed elevated production in one year only led the party 
apparatchik in Moscow to expect such production to continue in perpetuity. Furthermore, 
most of the analysts crunching numbers and monitoring the production flows were 
young, arrogant technologists. They sat behind computers and discovered the data that 
their older, more experienced counterparts had spent careers trying to keep from their 
superiors in Moscow. Khodorkovsky’s transparency initiative represented a threatening 
affront to the veteran cadre working at Yukos.93 
Khodorkovsky was also the first to begin dismantling a fundamental social 
contract from the Soviet era. Oil companies, as state-owned enterprises, historically 
existed not simply to produce oil or maintain a positive revenue stream, they existed to 
create jobs. After privatization, profit became king. In order to keep Yukos afloat during 
its period of tribulation in the late 1990s, Khodorkovsky did what was otherwise 
considered unthinkable: he laid off employees. In a 1998 interview transcribed in Martin 
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Sixsmith’s book, Putin’s Oil: The Yukos Affair and the Struggle for Russia, 
Khodorkovsky seems to take pride in making ruthless personnel decisions, cutting the 
Yukos staff by 30% and mandating a 30% salary cut for the remaining 100,000 
employees.94 
Many of the laid off workers lived in remote West Siberian oil towns that relied 
on the oil industry for their existence. When Yukos shut down operations, the economy 
of these towns vanished. Even in the locations where Yukos maintained production, 
Khodorkovsky did not invest in social projects that were customary in the Soviet era. 
Yukos did not fund schools, create family housing, or build hospitals.95 In this sense, 
Khodorkovsky’s business decisions represented more than a superficial change of course, 
they represented a betrayal of the people. 
The last noteworthy affront to the old hierarchy within the oil industry was less 
about the changes that were instituted, and more about the demographic make-up of the 
people involved. Of course, the fact that foreigners made many of the decisions was a 
significant insult to Russian pride. However, the foreigners did not hold a monopoly on 
criticism. Mikhail Khodorkovsky also drew the ire of the neftianiki within Yukos and 
political conservatives in the Kremlin.  Both the neftianiki and the conservatives spent 
most of their careers in the top-down, rigid, command economy of the Soviet Union, in a 
culture of commitment to the Motherland, respect for elders, and anti-Semitism. It is no 
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wonder that they treated the young, arrogant, Jewish Mikhail Khodorkovsky with so 
much disdain.  
David Hoffman expounds on Khodorkovsky’s brash style with an anecdote in his 
book, The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia. Hoffman notes a book that 
Khodorkovsky and his business associate wrote to describe their new business in the 
early 1990s, Menatep Bank. This book, Man with a Ruble – a title meant to mock the 
famous Soviet play about Lenin, Man with a Gun – extoled the greatness of wealth and 
greed, stating such blasphemes as, “our idol is his financial majesty the capital” and “our 
compass is profit.”96 These were controversial positions even in late-1990s Russia and 
they did not help Khodorkovsky curry any favor with those of an older mindset. 
While Yukos represented a particularly aggressive adoption of Western 
technology, business practices, and capitalist values, it was not the only oil company to 
experience gains. LUKoil and Surgutneftgaz also took advantage of ruble devaluation 
and higher oil prices to strengthen their revenue streams, only through less controversial 
methods. Vagit Alekperov at LUKoil slowly adopted Western technology and methods, 
but did so in a quieter, less antagonistic manner. Meanwhile, Vladimir Bogdanov at 
Surgutneftgaz tried to keep pace in production by doubling down on old Soviet methods 
and simply drilling an inordinate number of new wells. Neither company managed to 
achieve success close to the Yukos turnaround. However, they both increased 
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government disapproval of Yukos by proving it possible to achieve some level of success 
while staying true to the ‘Soviet way.’97 
 
Legacy of the Economic and Oil Recovery 
 
Despite the more traditional methods of LUKoil and Surgutneftgaz, the great oil 
recovery that occurred in the late-1990s and early-2000s shattered the rigid production 
practices and sacrosanct worker-employer social contract of Soviet days. As Thane 
Gustafson describes in his 2012 book, Wheel of Fortune, the conservative view of 
Western-induced changes was that, “Tight financial and production controls were 
repressive… Profit maximization was predatory. Tax optimization was criminal.”98 In 
terms of corporate strategy, the oil industry recovery can best be characterized by the 
prioritization of brownfield revitalization over greenfield exploration and production. 
While the short-term effects were unmistakably beneficial for the companies, the long-
term benefits were less clear. In prioritizing the rehabilitation of legacy assets, the oil 
companies neglected to invest in discovering and developing new fields. When the 
miraculous recovery of the brownfields ended and the oil companies had few new assets 
to bring online, they became vulnerable to those voices eager to criticize them. 
The conservatives never wanted the oil industry privatized. They resented the 
upstart oligarchs making off with massive assets that they believed rightfully belonged to 
the state. Furthermore, they loathed the influence that Western companies gained in the 
latter half of the 1990s. Fortunately for the conservatives, the timing of the collapse of the 
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oil industry and, indeed, the broader economy coincided nicely with the 2000 election of 
one of their own, Vladimir Putin. Putin came to power as the Russian economy turned the 
corner and the oil industry began to experience its revitalization. He was not responsible 
for these economic good fortunes, but, an apt craftsman of public perception, he 
nonetheless took credit and reaped a dividend of political capital, capital he used to 
reverse the liberalization of the 1990s and reassert state power over the oil industry. 
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Chapter V: The Origins of Resource Revanchism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 2000 presidential election in Russia was the culminating event of the 
meteoric rise of Vladimir Putin. In just four years, Putin went from being deputy mayor 
of St. Petersburg to President of Russia. The public did not know it at the time, but, with 
his election, Putin brought a markedly different ideology to the Kremlin. He and his inner 
circle – a group of conservative policymakers, many of whom were former KBG officers 
– represented a sharp departure from the path of economic liberalization pursued by Boris 
Yeltsin throughout the 1990s. This inner circle of revisionist allies and officials, known 
collectively as the siloviki, believed that the failure of the Soviet Union was a travesty. 
Famously, Vladimir Putin bluntly stated in 2005 that the collapse of the Soviet Union 
was, “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century.99  
To the siloviki, devolution of power in Moscow, economic openness, and shifts 
toward Western values represented an embarrassment of grand scale. They believed 
Russia’s influence on the global stage was diminished and resolved to reverse that 
trajectory. Over time, the reassertion of state authority and ownership over the oil sector 
became one of the most important components of the siloviki strategy. In order to 
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understand the reversal of reformist policies and sudden revanchist pursuit of Russian oil 
resources, it is imperative to understand the years and experiences that shaped the 
mentality of Vladimir Putin and his inner circle. 
 
The Siloviki Mind 
 
The siloviki were not just economic conservatives opposed to liberalization, they 
were intimidating individuals whose previous positions in government included time in 
the Soviet security apparatus, the KGB, and other so-called power ministries.100 In 
analyzing the mindset that Vladimir Putin brought to the Kremlin in 2000, it is useful to 
review some key experiences throughout his most formative years, those spent abroad as 
a Soviet intelligence officer; and the works of some of his favorite writers and strategic 
thinkers, specifically those he saw fit to send as required reading to the governors of the 
various Russian provinces. 
Vladimir Putin accepted a position as an intelligence officer in the KGB around 
1975. Details about his first post are nebulous; some believe, tellingly, that Putin worked 
in the Fifth Directorate, the KGB arm responsible for internal order and the suppression 
of dissent.101 In 1985, Putin was posted to Dresden, East Germany, where he worked with 
the East German secret police, the stasi.102 This was a tumultuous time in East Germany, 
with the Soviet Union rapidly changing under Mikhail Gorbachev’s transformative 
perestroika polices and local Dresden demonstrations increasing. The Kremlin was losing 
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its grip on power, and the events of the months leading up to and immediately following 
the fall of the Berlin Wall seemed to leave an indelible mark on the young Putin. 
In October 1989, trains of asylum seekers were allowed to pass through East 
Germany en route from Prague to West Germany.103 The cars were locked, but crowds of 
East Germans in Dresden tried desperately to hop aboard and escape. Such unrest only 
increased after the Berlin Wall was opened less than one month later on November 7. The 
ire of the protesters in Dresden quickly turned to the KGB and stasi facilities. A few 
weeks later, on December 5, Putin was moved by the increasingly aggressive crowd to 
call upon a Soviet tank unit to come bolster the KGB facility. Putin believed that this 
would be a small task for comrades with whom he socialized regularly. Instead, they 
could not provide support because Moscow did not respond to their request for 
permission to act.104 Putin’s own recollection of this event and the subsequent Soviet 
withdrawal from Eastern Europe is telling:  
 
We burned so much [classified material] that the furnace exploded. Moscow 
was silent… I only regretted that the Soviet Union had lost its place in 
Europe, although intellectually I understood that a position built on walls… 
cannot last. But I wanted something different to rise in its place. And nothing 
different was proposed. That’s what hurt. They just dropped everything and 
went away… We would have avoided a lot of problems if the Soviets had not 
made such a hasty exit from Eastern Europe.105 
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The futility of the Kremlin to respond effectively to the protests and to protect its 
KGB officers affected young Putin’s view on the fragility of political elites. According to 
biographer Boris Reitschuster, "Now when you have crowds in Kiev in 2004, in Moscow 
in 2011 or in Kiev in 2013 and 2014, I think he remembers this time in Dresden, and all 
these old fears come up inside him."106 This incident certainly influences the views that 
Putin and the siloviki have on the importance of centralized power and makes them more 
inclined to exert control over the electorate. 
Other characteristics of Vladimir Putin include his desire to return Russia to global 
prominence, his deep pride in Russian culture and history, and his belief that the West is 
threatening to both. This worldview is illustrated in the works of three 19th and 20th 
century Russian philosophers, Nikolai Berdyaev, Vladimir Solovyov, and Ivan Ilyin. 
Their writings maintain common themes: Russian exceptionalism, Orthodox faith, and 
autocracy.107  
The texts describe Russia as the great bridge between Europe and Asia – a place of 
values, faith, and robust history deserving of a place of power on the global stage. These 
sentiments come across frequently in Putin’s speeches and are clear through his foreign 
policy calculations and conservative social agenda. The connection of this philosophical 
framework to Vladimir Putin’s agenda is almost eerily apparent in the work of Ivan Ilyin: 
“we trust and are confident that our hour will come when Russia will rise from 
																																																						
106  Bowlby, Chris. “Vladimir Putin's formative German years.” BBC News. March 27, 2015. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-32066222. 
107 Brooks, David. “Putin Can’t Stop.” New York Times. March 3, 2014. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/opinion/brooks-putin-cant-stop.html?_r=0. 
	64	
disintegration and humiliation and begin an epoch of new development and greatness.”108 
Later on, during his third term as President, Putin required that Russia’s regional 
governors read a book by each of these authors over the 2014 holiday season.109 
In addition to these experiences and writings, Vladimir Putin is also shaped by the 
like-minded individuals that surround him. Perhaps no member of the siloviki shares 
Putin’s views more than Igor Sechin. Sechin was a member of the Leningrad KVS 
(Foreign Liaison Services) when he first met Vladimir Putin in 1990. The two became 
friends, and Sechin began working for Putin in 1991. Since then, Sechin and Putin have 
been close political allies, with Sechin advancing alongside of Putin. When Putin became 
president, Sechin was made deputy prime minister. The siloviki wing of government 
quickly coalesced around him.110 In 2004, one cabinet minister reportedly stated, “Sechin 
is not just Putin’s sounding board, Sechin is part of Putin’s brain cells.”111 This 
relationship and Sechin’s views on the proper role of the state in the oil sector proved to 
be important as Putin sought to address energy issues. 
The formative years as a young KGB officer, his belief in conservative values and 
Russian exceptionalism, and the siloviki cadre that made up his inner circle all 
contributed to the formation of the ideology that Putin brought to Moscow when he was 
elected president in 2000. He sought to reestablish the Kremlin as the true locus of power 
in Russia and return Russia to a place of prominence in the international community. In 
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order to achieve these goals, Putin had to rebuild the recently-collapsed economy and 
solidify a steady stream of revenue coming into the treasury. With oil production 
beginning to rebound and oil prices starting to surge, Putin and his allies resolved to 
begin their reconsolidation of money and power by targeting the oil industry. 
 
Putin Forms an Energy Policy: The Birth of Resource Revanchism 
 
The miraculous turnaround of the brownfield assets of the Russian oil industry 
offered a lucrative opportunity for Vladimir Putin to reassert control and capture a greater 
share of the economic rents flowing from the oil sector. While there is some indication 
that Putin and Sechin were at least marginally open to some economic liberalization in 
the early 1990s, the corruption and embarrassment they perceived from the loan-for-
shares deal, coupled with the economic collapse of 1998, shattered their faith in market 
reforms. As previously mentioned, the reformers viewed the recession as a result of 
Russia’s inability to fully open up to world markets fast enough. Their solution was thus 
to double down on liberal reforms. Putin and Sechin fell in the conservative camp that 
took the opposite view. They believed that embracing Western-style capitalism failed the 
state and the Russian people.  
When Putin took office, he started Russia down the path of a different style of 
capitalism. While he did not seek to fully renationalize the oil industry, he did seek to 
reassert heavy state influence over it. There are few sources that help elucidate Putin’s 
thinking on this policy shift, though one of them, a 1999 journal article, is particularly 
informative. In this paper, Putin emphasizes that the resource sector is the key to national 
economic growth and that, in the wake of the economic collapse, this sector must be used 
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to fill the treasury so that the state can invest in social and infrastructure projects. He 
believed that this should be done through public-private partnerships and that the state 
should help the resource sector, particularly the oil industry, shift its focus higher up on 
the value chain so that both the state and the industry could move away from pure 
extractive industry activities and benefit from producing higher value-added goods.112  
As Putin’s first term progressed, concurrently with the increased Western 
influence at Yukos, his views seemed to shift. Perhaps due to influence from others in the 
siloviki wing of the Kremlin or his more hard-lined confidant, Igor Sechin, Putin came to 
pursue a more assertive approach in dealing with the oil industry, taking less of an 
interest in reform and more of an interest in increasing the power of the state. He was not 
willing to tolerate defiance or obstruction to his plans for rebuilding Russian prestige, 
certainly not from the industry most critical to achieving his goal. 
 
Finding the Taxes 
 
Putin’s quest to rebuild Russia’s economic and international prestige through 
recapturing oil rents started with seeking to solidify the tax base. In the Soviet era, the tax 
regime was not important. Under the command economy, the state owned all industry. 
Therefore, if the Kremlin wanted to see greater revenue coming out of the oil industry, it 
either mandated higher production and sold more oil, or raised the price per unit. Putin 
did not have the luxury of Soviet-era control over the entire economy, and therefore 
needed to shore up the tax regime in order to secure the state’s revenue stream. 
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Russia did not solidify its tax regime in the 1990s. Even as late as Putin’s election 
in 2000, the Russian tax system was in shambles.113 The system was complicated. 
Companies all throughout the economy took advantage of loopholes and the formal 
institutions for tax collection were weak at best. The oil companies hid profits from 
official reports, stored cash abroad in tax havens, and used joint ventures with foreign 
companies to sidestep paying taxes at home. The regional governments lacked tax 
collection enforcement mechanisms and often accepted tax payments in kind, in the form 
of actual oil.  
The Kremlin was not much better at maintaining the fidelity of the tax collection 
system, as its threats toward companies were often arbitrary and empty. In order to make 
up for a lack of enforcement across the entire economy, Moscow targeted a few of the 
largest companies. This had the effect of shrinking the effective tax base. As large 
companies, this strategy put the oil industry under a spotlight, but still did not keep them 
from avoiding payment. It is estimated that in 1998 oil industry companies were so 
successful in avoiding taxes that they only paid approximately one-quarter to one-third of 
their actual revenues.114 
In order to solidify the state’s tax revenue stream, Putin assigned his close 
confidant, Aleksei Kudrin, as Minister of Finance. Kudrin held this office for eleven 
years, from 2000 to 2011, making his access to Putin second only to Igor Sechin. With 
Putin’s blessing, Kudrin sought to make several relative straightforward changes to the 
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Russian tax regime. By lowering tax rates, broadening the tax base, and closing tax 
loopholes Kudrin believed he could increase the overall revenue stream coming into the 
Kremlin. By instituting a more robust collection and enforcement mechanism, Kudrin 
reduced the ability of firms to avoid payment. Since the majority of companies in the 
broader economy had relative small tax liabilities and lacked the resources to employ 
accountants that specialized in finding loopholes, the public reaction to lower rates was 
largely positive. However, the oil industry understood that the new system meant that 
they would no longer be able to  “optimize” their taxes, thereby representing a threat to 
their bottom line.115 
Despite Kudrin’s efforts, the oil industry continued to obfuscate its books. He 
decided to make a radical change. The tax equation for oil companies at the time was 
two-pronged. First, companies were taxed on exports in order to incentivize the 
companies to provide low cost oil domestically. Secondly, companies were taxed on 
profits instead of overall revenue. This system was meant to raise revenue for the state 
while also being conscientious of the fact that, due to fluctuations in global oil markets, 
large revenues did not always indicate a successful company with large profit margins. 
However, taxing profits was difficult because there were many ways for oil companies to 
game the system in order to hide the actual profit figures and make their margins appear 
deceptively slim.  
Aleksei Kudrin’s response was to shift to a single-factor tax rate based on gross 
revenue. The oil companies were appalled. Under this new tax equation, the government 
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paid no mind to the performance of their oilfields, the risks taken by investing in new 
exploration and production, or the possibility that global market forces would squeeze 
their profitability. Kudrin and Putin did not care. Putin, in particular, had little sympathy 
for the oil companies or their owners. He believed that the executives had already robbed 
the state by being allowed to take ownership of the oil assets. He would not tolerate “tax 
optimization,” even if technically legal, viewing it as unpatriotic and unacceptable. The 
plan worked. The tax revenue received by the Kremlin increased from $5.6 billion in 
1999 to $83.2 billion in 2005.116 
 
Conclusion 
 
By 2002, Vladimir Putin was reaping the rewards of the miraculous Russian 
economic turnaround buoyed by rising global oil prices and increased oil sector 
productivity (the result of Western technology and business practices, no less). He was 
also profiting from a tax revenue stream from the oil industry that was both markedly 
greater and more reliable than during the Yeltsin administration. While Putin cannot 
legitimately claim much more than tangential credit for the economic recovery, the 
Russian public did not know this. They saw an economy that was revived on his watch. 
In politics, the leaders with the greatest mandates to govern are those with broad public 
support. With the economic miracle, Putin and his allies in the siloviki wing of the 
government gained the political capital necessary to push their agenda further. Over the 
course of his first administration, Putin became more of a conservative statist seeking to 
consolidate power. As such, his scorn for the reformers and oligarchs grew. No company 
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or oligarch drew his ire and tested his patience more than Yukos and Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky. 
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Chapter VI: Putin Takes Action 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yukos in the Crosshairs 
 
By 2002 to 2003, Putin and the siloviki began focusing more attention on Yukos 
and Mikhail Khodorkovsky. While there were certainly other companies within the oil 
industry employing Western technology and practices, and other oligarchs in various 
sectors that flaunted their largess, Yukos warranted special attention for several reasons. 
In addition to the tax optimization methods explained previously, Yukos ran afoul with 
the Kremlin for using extraction tactics and business practices that were seen as 
damaging to the physical resources in the ground. Moreover, on an individual level, Putin 
and the siloviki wanted to make an example out of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. In Putin’s 
eyes, Khodorkovsky was the very embodiment of all that was wrong with liberal 
reforms.117 He stood for Western ideals such as government accountability. He 
championed capitalism and loyalty to shareholders over the state. Worst of all, he openly 
and arrogantly alluded to his political ambitions to replace Putin. 
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As previously discussed, the Western oilfield development strategies that Yukos 
used were horrifying to the Soviet-era oil workers that the company employed. 
Schlumberger and Joe Mach shut in wells, operated dangerously close to the bubble 
point, and fracked large swaths of land. They viewed the Western practices as a type of 
scorched earth policy. The siloviki and other conservatives in the Kremlin echoed these 
sentiments. Yukos also ran afoul of the old guard for its techniques because 
Khodorkovsky and Mach saw profit and asset value as their end game. Therefore, they 
sought to push production and sales when oil prices were high. They understood the time 
value of money, the importance of acquiring new assets, and that simply the names on its 
Board of Directors could affect the value of the company. The Kremlin believed the 
focus on profit and the practices that followed were detrimental to the resources in the 
ground, resources still technically owned by the state. 
Of all the oligarchs that reaped the rewards of Boris Yeltsin’s Faustian loans-for-
shares bargain, none reached such heights as Mikhail Khodorkovsky did from 2000 to 
2003. In 2001, Forbes estimated Khodorkovsky’s net worth at $2.4 billion. Just one year 
later, Khodorkovsky broke with the tacit understanding among oligarchs that the 
businesses remain secretive. He disclosed the organizational structure of Yukos and 
revealed, arrogantly, that the company was in fact owned by a small group of business 
associates that were long suspected of having unsavory ties to the Yeltsin government 
around the time of the asset sale. It was almost as if Khodorkovsky wished to flaunt his 
ability to use government influence to amass money and power.  And money he had. The 
same 2002 disclosure also revealed Khodorkovsky’s net worth to be approximately $8 
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billion.118 Putin was disgusted by the oligarchs’ wealth and sense of entitlement. In a 
2003 interview with the New York Times, Putin explained: 
 
We [Russia] have a category of people who have become billionaires, as we 
say, overnight… The state appointed them as billionaires. It simply gave out a 
huge amount of property, practically for free. They said it themselves, ‘I was 
appointed a billionaire.’ Then… they got the impression that the gods 
themselves slept on their heads, that everything is permitted to them.119 
 
Despite the roughshod oilfield development practices; the unsavory tax 
optimization; and the proud, public opulence; Yukos may still have been largely left 
alone. After all, Roman Abramovich and his oil company, Sibneft, employed Western 
techniques. Even Vagit Alekperov and LUKoil engaged in similar strategies, albeit with a 
cautious eye not to anger the Kremlin. Truly, Vladimir Bogdanov at Surgutneftgaz was 
the only oil company executive to adhere strictly to Soviet oil doctrine. So what was it 
about Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Yukos that pitted Vladimir Putin and the siloviki so 
fiercely against them? The most convincing differences were Khodorkovsky’s public 
disrespect for Putin and the state itself, his seemingly independent foreign policy, and 
threatening forays into politics. 
In February 2003, Putin met with the Russian Union of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs. It was essentially a forum for the oligarchs to communicate with the 
Kremlin. At this meeting, which aired live on Russian television, Mikhail Khodorkovsky 
made a fateful decision to publicly challenge Putin on issues of government transparency 
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and corruption, an odd claim coming from someone with a history of shady business 
dealings. First, Khodorkovsky claimed that corruption was rampant among tax collectors, 
particularly those dealing with oil, and that the sheer number of applicants for such jobs 
indicated that it was seen as a path to wealth. Next, he took issue with the recent purchase 
of Northern Oil by Rosneft. Khodorkovsky stated that the $622.6 million that was paid 
for the asset was well beyond market value and then wondered how Rosneft, a relatively 
poor company, could afford to overbid such as they did without help from the Kremlin. 
He then turned to Vladimir Putin and stated, “Your bureaucracy is made up of bribe-
takers and thieves.” Putin refused to allow Khodorkovsky’s accusations to stand 
unanswered, particularly in such a public forum. He retorted by questioning the fairness 
of the deals through which Yukos came to control its most prized assets, stating slyly, 
“Some companies, including Yukos, have excess reserves. We still have to investigate 
how they obtained them.” 120  
In May 2003, Khodorkovsky pushed his luck even further by signing a deal with the 
Chinese government to provide 20 to 30 million tons (approximately 140 to 210 million 
barrels) of oil per year for 20 years. The massive deal hinged on the development of 
Yukos assets in Eastern Russian and the promise to build a pipeline specifically to serve 
the deal. By signing a contract with the Chinese government itself, Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky and the Yukos team were, in effect, implementing their own foreign 
policy initiatives. Adding insult to injury, not only did Yukos circumvent the Kremlin’s 
authority in the realm of foreign policy, its promise to build a pipeline represented a 
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threat to Transneft’s monopoly over the oil pipeline network in Russia. This behavior 
infuriated Putin and his allies.121 
In addition to the affronts to the Kremlin’s authority over foreign policy, May 2003 
also saw the height of Yukos’ irreverence for the legislative process. During this time, the 
Duma, Russia’s legislative body, was debating a bill that would shape the legality of 
production sharing agreements. Given that the legislation was of considerable importance 
to Yukos, Khodorkovsky called on the cadre of Duma members that he kept on his 
payroll, counting on them to shape the legislation in Yukos’ favor. By some estimates, 
Khodorkovsky retained upwards of 100 Duma members through bribes.122 Throughout 
this particular debate, Vladimir Dubov, the Duma member closest to Yukos, allowed the 
company’s legal team to sit next to him in the chamber as the bill was being marked up. 
In the most explosive instance, another crooked legislator, Sergei Shtogrin, stood at the 
front of the assembly to offer amendments to the bill while simultaneously holding a cell 
phone to his ear and taking orders from the Yukos legal team.123 
These offenses were very likely more than enough to convince Putin to commence 
an investigation of Yukos. However, what sealed the fate of Mikhail Khodorkovsky was 
his venture into politics. It was one thing to cheat the state out of taxes and disrespect the 
legislative process. It was another thing altogether to threaten Vladimir Putin directly. 
Khodorkovsky became a spokesman, rather ironically, for increased transparency in 
governance, Western-style democratic institutions, and civil society. He created a 
																																																						
121 Goldman, Marshall. Petrostate. 111. 
122 Goldman, Marshall. Petrostate. 113. 
123 Gustafson, Thane. Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and Power in Russia. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2012. 295. 
	76	
foundation called Open Russia that sought to foster ties with the United Kingdom and 
United States and contributed an initial donation of $16 million.124 He donated tens of 
millions of dollars to opposition political parties such as Yabloko and the Union of Right 
Forces.125 In addition to these indirect political threats, Khodorkovsky threated Putin 
himself by hinting that he might leave Yukos in 2007 in order to run for president in 
2008. This crossed a line that Putin was not willing to ignore.126 
 
The Fall of Yukos 
 
In the summer of 2003, Vladimir Putin decided to target Yukos and 
Khodorkovsky in earnest. He instructed the General Procuracy to open an investigation. 
The Prosecutor General, Vladimir Ustinov, was a longtime ally of Putin and nominated 
for his position in part for that very reason. Ustinov coordinated the harassment of Yukos 
and its officials through raids, tax investigations, and arrests. He even opened 
investigations against Menatep Bank in an effort to specifically target Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky.127  
Sensing that the government was not just seeking to intimidate him, 
Khodorkovsky made it known that he was in discussions to sell a substantial portion of 
Yukos to Exxon-Mobil or Chevron. Negotiations that began in 2002 progressed through 
the summer of 2003 and, in early October 2003, Yukos and Exxon signed a protocol of 
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understanding outlining the sale of 40-50 percent of Yukos. Exxon CEO Lee Raymond 
met with Vladimir Putin twice in September 2003 to discuss the sale and did not believe 
that the government would object.128 Hindsight is certainly 20/20, but given what the 
world now knows about Vladimir Putin’s ideology and his views on the importance of 
strategic state assets, it seems unlikely that he ever had any intention of allowing the sale 
of 40-50 percent of Russia’s largest, most profitable oil company to a foreign firm, an 
American firm, no less.129 
After the preliminary agreement between Yukos and Exxon was signed in early 
October, Putin knew that he had to make his move. Several weeks later, in mid-October, 
police raided Khodorkovsky’s home and a school funded by Yukos, claiming that 
computers donated to the school had incriminating evidence on their hard drives. 
Khodorkovsky was not home at the time, but his wife was frightened by the incident. 
Furious at the affront to his family, Khodorkovsky held a press conference and boldly 
dared the government to come after him personally, stating, “If the goal is to drive me 
from the country or put me in jail, they had better put me in jail.”130 On October 25, 2003, 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky landed at an airfield in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk. A unit of 
the Russian special police force met him, raided the aircraft, and arrested him on charges 
of fraud and tax evasion.131 
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On November 2, Khodorkovsky resigned as CEO of Yukos, but Putin was not 
satisfied with bringing down Khodorkovsky alone. Russian officials continued their 
pursuit of Yukos’ other executives, mid-level managers, and assets. The government 
arrested the heads of Yukos’ major subsidiaries, claiming that they physically damaged 
oilfields, reducing their ultimate production potential. The official charge was that the 
Yukos officials violated the oilfield development plans filed with the state, but it was 
clear that their real violation was the wholehearted embrace of Western practices deemed 
to be contrary to Moscow’s interests. With Khodorkovsky gone, Yukos was rudderless. 
With its mid-level managers ousted, it lacked the ability to operate effectively. In June 
2004, Yukos’ assets were frozen pending investigation.132  
It is without doubt that Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s personal actions and 
management of Yukos represented, far and away, the most controversial behavior of any 
oligarch. The catalog of offenses, both those that actually violated statutes and those that 
simply angered the Kremlin, was staggering: ‘destruction’ of oilfields, public disrespect 
toward the government, excessive ties to foreigners, and supporting opposition political 
parties, to name a few. However, the fall of Yukos represented much more than an assault 
on one person or one company. The government’s actions toward Yukos and Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky were signals to the oil industry that answered many of the legal questions 
that pervaded the relationship between the industry and the state since the assets were 
privatized in 1995. Executives who wondered whether or not questionable tax 
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optimization and controversial oilfield management practices, among other things, were 
prosecutable offenses got their answer. The effects on the oil industry were monumental. 
 
Foreign Targets 
 
The story of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Yukos offers a clear example of 
Vladimir Putin’s intentions to roll back the power of the oligarchs and reassert state 
control over the oil industry. However, it is worth noting that Yukos is far from the only 
company brought back under state control by the Kremlin’s policy of resource 
revanchism. Indeed, Putin did not only target domestic companies controlled by the brash 
oligarch class. He also targeted foreign companies that signed deals he felt were 
unfavorable to the state. One prominent example that is representative of this broader 
trend is the Kremlin’s handling of oil and gas development on Sakhalin Island. 
Sakhalin Island is located off of Russia’s far east coast, approximately 30 miles 
north of Japan. The island has a long history of oil production, dating back to an onshore 
joint venture with Japan in 1928. Russia wanted to develop more substantial production 
in the 1970s, but put its plans on hold after the start of the war in Afghanistan. After the 
fall of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin decided to seek foreign partners to help develop 
Sakhalin’s potential and facilitate badly-needed technology transfer. It is likely that 
Sakhalin did not fall under one of the holding companies established in 1992 due to its 
extreme geographic isolation and lack of large production wells at the time. As such, the 
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state signed deals with two consortia in the mid-1990s. The Sakhalin I and Sakhalin II 
projects were to be operated by ExxonMobil and Shell, respectively.133 
Unfortunately for the Kremlin, its desperation to begin developing Sakhalin’s 
resource potential combined with low oil prices put the state at a disadvantage when 
negotiating the Sakhalin contracts. As a result, Moscow signed PSAs giving generous tax 
and cost recovery provisions to the foreign investors. These were exactly the types of 
contracts that Putin and the siloviki felt robbed the state of its rightful resource bounty. 
Putin knew that the government officials that signed the deals in the mid-1990s did so 
because they were negotiating from a position of weakness. He was determined to rectify 
the situation once he had the upper hand.134 
In 2006, just two years after the state successfully orchestrated the fall of Yukos, 
Putin took aim at the Sakhalin II agreement signed with Shell. Having recently undergone 
the early-2000s oil chudo, the Russian oil industry and economy in 2006 were much 
more robust than they were at the time the Shell deal was signed. Oil prices were higher, 
production was up, and tax revenue flowed more steadily. Conversely, Shell was 
struggling. The Sakhalin project was significantly behind schedule and budget. This 
angered the Kremlin because Shell’s contract allowed for them to recover cost oil to pay 
for the capital spent getting the wells online. As such, every dollar over budget spent by 
Shell getting the wells producing meant that Russia would have to wait longer to see any 
revenue from the project. Additionally, Shell was being targeted by environmentalists 
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due to its operations on Sakhalin and was threatened with a $50 million lawsuit. Given 
Shell’s weakened position, Putin decided it was time to revisit the contract.135 
After meeting with Putin, the CEOs from the foreign consortium members agreed 
to each sell half of their respective shares in the project to Gazprom. This had the 
practical effect of giving the state 50% plus one share ownership of the project. For their 
shares, the foreign companies were paid a total of $7.45 billion, far less than what the 
shares were worth after the time and money that the foreigners put into the project.136 A 
Shell spokesman likened the deal to allowing Gazprom to “enter on the ground floor.”137 
The foreigners doubtlessly felt as though Russia violated their contract and that after ten 
years worth of development costs, the Kremlin was unfairly strong-arming them to 
renegotiate. They were right. The Sakhalin II investors fell victim to the siloviki plan to 
recapture natural resource assets just two years after Yukos met the same fate. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Riding a wave of public support brought about by the economic recovery, 
Vladimir Putin was soundly reelected in 2004. In his second term, he continued to claw 
back Russia’s oil industry assets from oligarchs and foreign companies, as the 2006 
takeover of Sakhalin II demonstrates. Putin and his siloviki allies saw an opportunity to 
push on with the next phase of their plan to further consolidate power over the country 
and rebuild Russian influence abroad. The assaults on Yukos and Sakhalin II only 
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represented the realization of the first phase of Vladimir Putin’s policy of resource 
revanchism. In order to truly wield the power of the massive oil industry both in domestic 
politics and on the international stage, Putin needed an oil company that he could control 
more directly, build into a powerful state-owned oil champion, and serve as a conduit for 
his power and policies. He found the perfect vehicle for his ambitions in a tiny firm, the 
only holding company that failed to privatize in 1995, Rosneft. 
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Chapter VII: Building a State Oil Champion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fending off Gazprom 
 
During the Soviet era, the Kremlin’s state oil and gas entity was known as 
Rosneftgaz, a consolidation of 301 separately operating oil and gas enterprises. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Rosneftgaz fell victim to the same centrifugal forces 
experiences by other sectors of the economy. When, as discussed in Chapter I, Boris 
Yeltsin agreed to create temporary holding companies, the most valuable enterprises 
sorted into three major entities, LUKoil, Surgutneftgaz, and Yukos. However, those three 
holding companies collectively absorbed only 42 of the 301 separate Soviet oil 
enterprises. Rosneft was created as a fourth holding company to house the remaining 259 
enterprises. The largest and most profitable enterprises all fell to one of the three major 
holding companies spun out of Rosneftgaz, but the sheer number of enterprises that were 
consolidated into the Rosneft holding company meant that it accounted for 60% of 
Russia’s total crude oil production.138  
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When the other three holding companies were privatized in 1995, Rosneft 
remained publically owned. Due to the fact that Rosneft consisted of a hodge-podge of 
enterprises, it was not particularly attractive to potential buyers. Rosneft’s assets were 
scattered all over the vast Russian landscape from the Caucasus to West Siberia to the Far 
East. Its refineries were outdated and required significant capital investment. Aside from 
oil assets, Rosneft also consisted of the many various components of old government 
ministries responsible for research. With no need for these functions, potential buyers did 
not want to be stuck with the responsibility for the tens of thousands of workers these 
institutes and ministry components employed.139 The result was a lack of suitors 
interested in purchasing Rosneft in full. 
In late 1998, Sergei Bogdanchikov took over as the head of Rosneft.140 He was 
neither a member of the oligarch class or the neftianiki. Bogdanchikov was fiercely 
patriotic and determined to turn Rosneft into a prominent state oil company. 
Unfortunately, the company he inherited was riddled with debt and in the midst of selling 
off its prime assets at bargain prices. Case in point, at the time Bogdanchikov took 
control, Rosneft had just sold its most productive and valuable subsidiary, Purneftgaz, for 
just $10 million.141 The Yeltsin administration was never particularly concerned with 
protecting state assets from a fire sale, but for some reason the sale of Purneftgaz angered 
the president. Yeltsin instructed the Russian internal security service, the FSB, to 
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investigate and recover the asset. This is an important event not only because Purneftgaz 
was in fact returned to Rosneft, but because in the process Bogdanchikov met the head of 
the FSB, Vladimir Putin, and his primary adjutant, Igor Sechin. 
When Putin was elected president in 2000, he maintained a strong relationship 
with Bogdanchikov. After all, both men shared strong statist inclinations and the belief 
that the oil industry should be used to Russia’s benefit, not pillaged by the oligarchs. 
Putin was not initially convinced that Rosneft was the best vehicle through which to 
pursue his energy agenda because the company was still quite weak. However, with 
Purneftgaz back under his control, Bogdanchikov set out to prove Rosneft’s worth and 
consolidate the company’s disparate assets. In 2002, Bogdanchikov used the windfall 
from rising oil prices to buy out those with minority stakes in Rosneft’s subsidiaries in 
order to centralize control of the company under his purview. By strengthening the 
company’s competitive position, Rosneft transformed into a viable state oil champion, 
and by maintaining relationships with Putin and Sechin, Bogdanchikov started seeing 
more support from the Kremlin.142 
The first real sign of state backing for Rosneft came in 2003. Rosneft and LUKoil 
were both interested in purchasing Northern Oil. Vagit Alekperov, still CEO of LUKoil, 
was one of the founding members of the consortium that formed Northern Oil in order to 
explore Timan-Pechora, a vast new oil region situated north of the Volga-Urals and west 
of West Siberia. Despite his original position, Alekperov and LUKoil were effectively 
forced out of the consortium, requiring them to bid independently for Northern Oil when 
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the remaining partners put it up for sale. Alekperov contemplated litigation but opted 
against it when he found out Northern Oil was sold to Rosneft. It was clear to Alekperov 
that Rosneft had the support of Putin. Mikhail Khodorkovsky did not have such tact. 
Recall that the Northern Oil sale was the instance brought up by Khodorkovsky at the 
fateful February 2003 meeting between Putin and the oligarchs. When he claimed that 
Bogdanchikov received unfair support from the state, Putin simply replied that Rosneft 
needed additional reserves. 143  
After the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the freezing of Yukos’ assets, 
Vladimir Putin began to push in earnest to realize his plan for creating a national energy 
champion. Based on the increasing support provided to Rosneft, Sergei Bogdanchikov 
believed that his company would be chosen to carry that banner. However, Putin had 
grander aspirations. Instead of simply creating a national oil company to complement 
Gazprom, the state-owned natural gas company that was never privatized after the Soviet 
collapse, Putin envisaged a singular state energy champion that placed both oil and gas 
under one company.  
Due to a law restricting foreigners from owning more than 20% of Gazprom, its 
market capitalization was drastically undervalued. Putin wanted to increase the 
company’s value by scrapping the law and allowing additional foreign investment, but 
not at the risk of losing the government’s controlling stake and veto power over 
decisions. The fear was that as foreign investment poured in, the percentage value of the 
state’s investment would be diluted below 50%, thus costing the Kremlin its control of 
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the company. Aleksei Miller, the CEO of Gazprom and a siloviki ally of Putin, proposed 
that the state secure its stake in Gazprom through a share swap of sorts. Miller suggested 
that the Kremlin sell Rosneft to Gazprom and receive Gazprom shares in return – 
essentially folding Rosneft into Gazprom as a subsidiary. By adding Gazprom shares 
equivalent to the value of Rosneft to the shares in the gas company that it already owned, 
the Kremlin could ensure it maintained its controlling stake even after lifting the foreign 
investment cap.144 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of Russian Oil Production from State and Private Firms 
 
 
Source: Russian Ministry of Energy found in Gustafson, Thane. Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and 
Power in Russia. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2012. 195. 
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Solidifying Supremacy 
 
Putin was initially on board with the plan, but its implementation faltered for 
several reasons. First, there was hesitance from senior Gazprom executives that were 
wary of expanding away from their bread and butter, natural gas. Secondly, the plan met 
opposition from Bogdanchikov and Igor Sechin. The two champions of Rosneft believed 
that the only way for the company to maintain its independence was to become so large 
that any effort by Gazprom to absorb it would fundamentally change the make-up of the 
gas company itself. Conveniently, the assets Sechin and Bogdanchikov sought to 
purchase were available in the form of old Yukos assets. 
In December 2004, the frozen Yukos assets were auctioned off in order to pay 
back what the Kremlin calculated to be $33 billion in back taxes. Ironically, in the same 
sort of rigged privatization auction lambasted by Putin and the siloviki, the largest prize, 
Yuganskneftgaz, was sold for $9.35 billion, a pittance, to a suspicious group of investors 
collectively known as the Baikal Finance Group. Not surprisingly, the Baikal Finance 
Group turned out to be a shell company for Rosneft.145 With this one acquisition, Rosneft 
increased its oil production from 21.6 million tons (154 million barrels) in 2004 to 74.4 
million tons (531 million barrels) in 2005, a threefold increase in just one year.146  
Though Putin initially intended to create a massive, singular state energy firm 
incorporating Gazprom, Rosneft, and the repatriated pieces of Yukos, he was still pleased 
with the outcome that allowed all of those assets to fall under state control. After 
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absorbing Yuganskneftgaz, Sergei Bogdanchikov was replaced as CEO of Rosneft with 
Igor Sechin. Though Putin and Bogdanchikov remained on good terms, it was clear that 
only the closest confidants of Putin would be trusted with the management of the two 
major state energy firms. Under Sechin, Rosneft continued to expand. In 2010, the 
massive Vankor oilfield in north-central Russia came online, increasing Rosneft’s annual 
production to 115.8 million tons (827 million barrels) of oil.147 
Today, Rosneft is the largest oil company in Russia, accounting for 40% of oil 
production in the country. At of the end of 2014, Rosneft claimed to have proved reserves 
just shy of 34 billion barrels of oil equivalent. Rosneft is the unquestioned crown jewel of 
the Russian oil industry. With a 70% stake in the company, the government ensures its 
success. All other oil companies in Russia operate at a disadvantage, as Rosneft is given 
preferred access to the most promising new discoveries, and all new discoveries above a 
certain size. Its rise from the ashes of the privatization process of the 1990s, coupled with 
the fall of Yukos, capped the shocking about face taken by the Russian government in the 
first decade of the 21st century.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent privatization of the Russian 
oil industry, the Kremlin under Vladimir Putin resolved not just to dispel with the notion 
that Western business practices and foreign intrusion were acceptable, but also to build a 
true national oil champion and reestablish the ability of the state to use the oil sector for 
the national interest. In this regard, Vladimir Putin was quite successful. At the time of 
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his election, state-owned oil companies produced only 16% of Russia’s crude oil output. 
By the time Putin finished his second term, that figure had risen to 50%.148 
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Chapter VIII: Pivot Points and Undercurrents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 to the end of Vladimir Putin’s first 
stint in office in 2008, the Russian oil industry experienced a boomerang-like trajectory. 
It began under total control of the state, with strict, centralized dictates coming from the 
Kremlin, and industry decisions being made for policy reasons rather than market-based 
rationale. In 1995, the state threw the ownership of its oil assets out to the private sector. 
However, many in the Kremlin were never fully comfortable with an independent oil 
industry. That view is best represented by Vladimir Putin and the siloviki wing of Russian 
politics. With Putin’s somewhat coincidental rise to power in 2000, the oil industry, 
particularly the liberal-minded oligarchs, were forced to contend with a more assertive 
state. While Putin’s relationship with the industry was not entirely confrontational and 
did include significant collaboration, it is clear that his overarching policy was to 
reestablish the authority of the state over the oil sector. By the end of Putin’s second term 
in office in 2008, the Kremlin had reestablished either legal ownership or de facto control 
over the oil industry, completing the boomerang trajectory and returning the oil industry 
to the hands of the state.  
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There were several reasons why the independence of the Russian oil industry was 
so short-lived. First, the privatization process that culminated with the corrupt loans-for-
shares scandal in 1995 completely undermined the legitimacy of the newly privatized 
firms and their owners. Indeed, such a corrupt process even undercut the general public’s 
trust in government by allowing a small, privileged group of businessmen to reap the 
financial benefits of state assets that had for decades been collectively owned by the 
Russian people. Additionally, the 1998 financial crisis and sovereign debt default shook 
the foundation of the Russian economy, providing another incident that precipitated the 
state’s revanchist actions toward the oil sector. In the wake of the recession and the 
subsequent revitalization of oil production, it was logical that the state wanted to reassert 
a greater level of control over the industry, making sure to restructure the oil tax regime 
and help guarantee a steadier revenue stream.  
However, while these instances certainly help explain how and why the Russian 
oil industry fell back under government control, they primarily offer surface-level 
evidence; factors such as the loan-for-shares scandal and the economic crisis of 1998 
were not so critical that they necessitated that the state reassert control over the oil 
industry. Instead, these events, along with the 2000 election of Vladimir Putin, served as 
important pivot points in the history of the Russian oil industry; pivot points that did not 
cause the renationalization of the oil industry themselves, but did help facilitate the 
foundational, historical and cultural undercurrents explicated throughout this analysis 
that led to that end. These cultural reasons include the long-standing, formidable history 
of authoritarian governance in Russia, a centuries-old suspicion of foreign intrusion, and 
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the shame associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Each of these core factors 
were punctuated by the aforementioned pivot points and, ultimately, brought to the 
forefront of national policy by Vladimir Putin and the siloviki wing of the government in 
the early 2000s.  
As discussed earlier, the tradition of strong centralized government in Russia is 
long-standing. The tsars were the standard bearers of absolute rule, leading the resistance 
against liberal constitutional reform in the heart of Europe so they would not have to fight 
it within Russia itself. The Soviet system purported to speak for the masses while it also 
brutally suppressed dissent. Over centuries of top-down rule dictating national policy and 
secret police forces hunting down those who spoke out or disobeyed orders, it is little 
surprise that the broader Russian polity has been infused with an ethos of adherence to 
the law. Russia is certainly not free of dissent. There is a vocal minority that speaks out in 
favor of civil liberties and against repressive government tactics. However, the broader 
predisposition towards obedience is much more abundant. It was seen in the Russian oil 
industry through the tense relationships between the old guard neftianiki and the 
management of the newly privatized firms, as well as the conflict-ridden interactions 
between the same firms and the Putin government. 
The old guard workers and managers fought to maintain Soviet-era practices. 
Most of their careers were spent in a time when profit considerations were unnecessary, 
wells were drilled for the sake of meeting specific government targets, and deviation 
from the Kremlin’s mandates was simply unthinkable. Furthermore, these communities 
of workers and their families were still engrained with the Soviet mindset that the 
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government would guarantee employment and basic necessities. This fundamental social 
contract between the Soviet government and its people engendered a willingness in 
families to endure living in far-flung Siberian oil towns despite the physical difficulties of 
everyday life. When the newly privatized oil industry uprooted this fundamental 
understanding by cutting wages and refusing to build schools and hospitals, it created 
great consternation among both average citizens and traditional-minded government 
officials alike. 
The same history of strong central government control also shaped the 
relationships that the nascent, private oil industry had with the government. While these 
companies were ostensibly independent, the Kremlin was never comfortable with an oil 
industry that was able to make business decisions without its approval. In the 1990s, 
Moscow used its control over Transneft to maintain veto power over various industry 
projects and regulate export permits, adding yet another layer of government oversight 
over the oil industry and restricting business decision-making. Despite the high level of 
influence that the government maintained in the 1990s, the Kremlin’s propensity for 
control was even greater during the post-2000 tenure of the siloviki.  
The Putin administration clamped down on oil industry actions that it did not 
deem beneficial to the state. In order to limit the independence of the industry, the tax 
regime was overhauled to recapture oil rents. Exploration and production (E&P) contracts 
that did not pass Kremlin muster were torpedoed. Furthermore, political ambitions and 
public defiance were anathema to the siloviki, as Mikhail Khodorkovsky could attest 
from his jail cell. In this regard, Russia’s limited experience with liberal governance and 
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capitalist business tactics deeply affected both the average oil worker and the political 
elites in the Kremlin, spurring a reversion to authoritarianism under which the oil 
industry was returned to state control. 
In addition to the history of strong centralized government, Russia’s deep 
suspicion of foreigners also proved to be a critical thread woven throughout the fabric of 
the oil industry story. From the 13th century Mongol invasions of what was then known as 
Kievan Rus,’ to the Napoleonic Wars of the 19th century, to the fight against Hitler in the 
1940s, the threat of foreign invasion has been a part of the collective societal 
consciousness for about as long as the Russian people have existed as a nation. This 
suspicion of foreigners extends beyond the perceived threat to territorial integrity. From 
1922 to 1991, the Soviet Union distinguished itself from the rest of the world not only by 
its borders, but also by its unique economic system. The communist order required tight 
economic control and separation from the rest of the world that was often justified 
through propaganda promoting cultural and economic exceptionalism. This isolation 
created another level of mistrust of foreigners that went beyond territorial threats to 
include fear of foreign economic intrusion and cultural corruption.  
Not surprisingly, this cultural characteristic came to the forefront when the oil 
industry was privatized in the 1990s. The industry fell to the control of oligarchs who 
disregarded Russian societal norms, placed profits and market capitalization above the 
needs of the state, and invited foreigners to buy large shares of Russia’s oil resources. 
Such actions provoked vitriol and suspicion from the public and political classes alike. 
Soviet era oil workers were skeptical of Western business practices and oilfield 
	96	
management, believing that excessive drilling and production rates would damage the 
health of their reservoirs. Meanwhile, policymakers in the Kremlin balked at the idea of 
companies like Yukos and LUKoil fully embracing such basic business ideas as the time 
value of money and tax optimization, considering them unpatriotic, Western cultural 
intrusions.  
Lastly, deep Russian national pride also served as another underlying factor 
affecting the relationship between the oil industry and the state. While the United States 
made some gestures of magnanimity after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russia of 
the 1990s was nonetheless humiliated by its new place in the shadow of the United 
States. The bitterness engendered by American global hegemony in the 1990s was felt 
most acutely by the siloviki class that came to power with Vladimir Putin. As products of 
the Cold War Soviet security apparatchik, the default lens through which they saw the 
world was a zero-sum competition with the United States; a competition not just for land 
or economic supremacy, but for prestige. In this worldview, anything that enhanced the 
reputation of the West diminished that of the Soviet Union. This mindset increased the 
suspicion that Western firms faced as they incorporated more efficient business practices 
into the Russian oil industry. It also explained much of the blame that the West received 
in the wake of the 1998 financial crisis and certainly contributed to Kremlin efforts to 
stymie Western investment in the oil industry. 
These three cultural factors – long-standing history of authoritarian governance, 
suspicion of foreign influence, and humiliation in the wake of the Soviet collapse – were 
less apparent in the 1990s. This is evidenced by Russia’s efforts to embrace democracy, 
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convert to a capitalist system, and its willingness to open its economy to Western 
investment. Yeltsin intended these policy changes to help Russia recover from the Soviet 
collapse and quickly return to global prominence. Instead of achieving his aims, Yeltsin’s 
administration culminated in the 1998 economic crisis, ushering in the siloviki era. With 
the election of Vladimir Putin, these cultural undercurrents found a champion willing to 
unabashedly make them part of national policy. As such, Putin prioritized his statist 
policies over the private sector, stamped out dissent, and sought to reestablish Russia as a 
geopolitical counterweight to the United States. The resource revanchism exerted over 
the oil industry was part of this plan. It is therefore not surprising that under Putin the 
Russian oil industry was the subject of dramatic tax reform, the state used Transneft to 
influence business decisions, and private companies were strong-armed into relinquishing 
assets to the state oil and gas champions, Rosneft and Gazprom. 
 
Implications for U.S. Policymakers: The NATO Case 
 
In 2008, Vladimir Putin was barred from running for the presidency again due to 
Russia’s constitutional limit of two consecutive presidential terms. Taking advantage of 
his high approval ratings, Putin put forth one of his protégés, Dmitri Medvedev, as a 
candidate to replace him. When Medvedev won the presidency, Putin stepped into the 
role of Prime Minister, leaving many to believe that he was truly running the government 
behind the scenes. In 2012, Putin and Medvedev again ran as a pair. However, they 
swapped roles, allowing Putin to reclaim the presidency. Before leaving office, 
Medvedev signed a bill extending the presidential term to six years. While this did not 
affect Medvedev himself, it does mean that Vladimir Putin’s current term will last until 
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2018, at which point he will be eligible to run again in order to stay in power through 
2024.149  
Such political musical chairs do little to veil the true political reality in Russia, 
that Putin and the siloviki continue to consolidate power in the Kremlin and extend 
influence throughout Russia’s various ministries and regional governments. U.S. 
policymakers would be wise to take note of the fundamental cultural factors that explain 
the renationalization of the Russian oil industry. They can offer insights into the mindset 
of Kremlin leadership and Russia’s ever-complicated relationship with the West, the most 
critical aspect being conflict over NATO. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most fundamental part of 
the United States’ relationship with Europe. Policymakers in the United States understand 
NATO to be a defensive alliance that incentivizes military-to-military partnerships, 
leverages the niche capabilities of smaller countries, and facilitates greater intelligence 
sharing in a period of growing global turmoil. The success of NATO relies on the sanctity 
of Article V of the North Atlantic Charter, the obligation of all allies to defend each other 
because an attack on one ally is tantamount to an attack on all.150 Inherent in this 
obligation is the belief that such collective security decreases the overall likelihood of 
armed conflict. Given the cultural and economic ties that the United States and Europe 
share, stability and security on the European continent will continue to be of vital 
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national interest to the United States for the foreseeable future, making the sustainability 
of NATO critically important. 
In early 2016, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, pinned Russia as the 
United States’ top threat, above terrorism, China, and Iran. One of the reasons for that 
assessment is the danger that Russia poses to European security.151 This further 
underscores the importance of NATO. As U.S. policymakers seek to understand Russia’s 
foreign policy intentions and relationship with NATO, they can glean insights through 
the same cultural undercurrents that affected the oil industry. Russia’s predisposition 
toward authoritarian rule leads to skepticism about the spread of liberal democratic 
institutions such as NATO. Russia’s fear of foreign influence means that policymakers in 
the Kremlin are deeply suspicious of all NATO activities. Lastly, Russia’s leaders are 
driven by the desire to undo the humiliation caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
As such, they regularly try to reassert sway in global affairs by undermining the United 
States and the NATO alliance. 
Despite the West’s insistence that NATO is purely defensive, the deep suspicion 
of foreigners that pervades Russian culture and the siloviki currently in government does 
not allow for NATO to be viewed as anything but a hostile entity that threatens Russian 
sovereignty and prestige. It is little wonder that Russia condemns each expansion of the 
Alliance as an affront to their national security. This reaction was understandable when 
the Baltic states joined, but the Kremlin even voiced its displeasure over Montenegro’s 
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ascension to full NATO membership in December 2015 even though NATO presence in 
the tiny Balkan country can hardly be seen as an existential threat to Moscow.152 
U.S. policymakers should expect to see Russia continue to test the cohesiveness 
of the NATO alliance, particularly in the Baltic states, Poland, and Georgia.153 Due to the 
fact that the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 with only conventional military 
threats in mind, Russia will likely stress the Alliance by engaging in unconventional 
tactics such as cyber warfare,154 clandestine paramilitary operations, and violations of 
sovereign airspace or territorial waters.155 Such actions pose tangible security threats, but 
do not clearly trigger the Article V mutual defense clause. The United States should keep 
in mind how Russian skepticism of foreign influence and post-Cold War embarrassment 
affect the country’s geopolitical strategy. Russia’s fear of foreign military, economic, and 
even cultural intrusion colored their handling of oil industry privatization in the 1990s 
and 2000s and continues to shape their relationship with NATO to this day. Such 
important cultural influences on Russian policy should always be in the minds of U.S. 
policymakers as they consider how Russia might respond to any new U.S. initiatives in 
Europe and changes in NATO policy.  
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Conclusion 
 
The path of the Russian oil industry is often explained through the lens of the 
loan-for-shares scandal and the 1998 economic crisis, pivot points that were important 
catalyzing events in the eventual return of the oil sector to state control. However, the 
more comprehensive approach taken in this study demonstrates the significance of the 
broader cultural undercurrents that ultimately sealed the industry’s fate: the history of 
authoritarian rule, suspicion of foreign influence, and the desire to rehabilitate Russia’s 
international prestige. The importance and usefulness of such cultural factors is that they 
offer insights well beyond the oil sector. While the NATO case offers a clear example of 
where these cultural undercurrents also impact broader Russian relations with the West, it 
is far from the only aspect of Russia-U.S. relations that they shape. In that vein, the 
lessons taken from the resource revanchism experienced by the Russian oil industry offer 
valuable tools to U.S. policymakers seeking to predict decisions made in the Kremlin and 
understand their impact on an increasingly complex world.  
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